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Introduction
In one of the last semesters of my studies I attended a course called Neuere
Methoden formaler Modellierung. In this course we were dealing with a wide
variety of computational simulations. My ﬁrst leading thought was to write this
thesis about simulations of pandemic phenomena. The topic, however, had to
be more situated in the ﬁeld of economics. Therefore we chose the wider ﬁeld
of economic simulations. We resolved to do a research in order to determine
the inﬂuence of social structure which underlies the computational approach of
simulations. After reading diﬀerent papers about the many applications that
you can ﬁnd in economics I was able to choose one of them for conducting my
research. My supervising tutors for this thesis also advised me to have a look
on the homepage of Leigh Tesfatsion. There I could ﬁnd various important
things and also the executable program and all the classes of code for the chosen
simulation. I just hope that some people are able to beneﬁt from this collection
of insights which have been given by other researchers and me.
It was much work and I needed some time to get it done. Therefore ﬁrst I'd like
to thank my parents for exercising patience and for their backing in all my years
of studying. Next I have to thank my adviser for his help on where to begin,
on the building of the work's structure and for the constructive feedback. I also
must thank a frien of mine who corrected my ﬂaws in the english language. Last
I have to express my gratitude to the developer of the SimBioSys framework who
gave some immediate assistance when I was facing problems with the simulation
program. With the help of all those people I ﬁnally managed to ﬁnish this thesis
and thus my master studies.
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Abstract
This thesis' goal is to conduct and compare the results of agent based compu-
tational economic simulations and diﬀerent structural conditions. Though there
are connections/similarities between agents (agent programs) as understood in
the computer sciences and the actual implemented simulated agents, these two
concepts have diﬀerent meanings  agents being the representation of thinking
(to very diﬀerent extents) and learning (modelled very diﬀerently). The com-
plexity of these agents' thinking and learning patterns/schemes itself is a current
research topic.
This thesis however is more concerned with the modelling of agents' interaction
patterns and thus the inner workings of whole economies and societies  based
on thinking agents. Current scientiﬁc literature on this topic discusses diﬀerent
bottom-up (agent based) approaches to diﬀerent economic and sociological prob-
lems, their diﬀerent sights stemming from diﬀerent partner sciences (sociology,
psychology, physics, computer sciences, law, policy sciences, etc.) and diﬀerent
research foci. These approaches heavily rely on computer based simulation since
the decisions and interactions of rather large numbers of agents are simulated,
which on the one hand need many calculations and on the other hand use algo-
rithmic methods not available to algebraic models.
One such research question concerns the type and form of the interaction- and
learning structures/space in which these agents `live', since it is believed to lead
to diﬀerent results. In the literature models can be found where agents either
live with space  on two-dimensional grids (regular or irregular) where agents
interact with their neighbours  as well as without space (everybody may inter-
act with anyone). Newer models look at the interactions between agents from
another perspective  the sociological  which states that important properties
of a society stem from its form  a social network (Small Worlds) which features
some important distant links between agents.
This thesis will try to compare an economic/sociological simulation by imple-
menting diﬀerent parameters and testing the existing combinations on these
models to compare the diﬀerent outcomes and the impact on the structure and
behaviour emerging in the simulation.
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1 Agent Based Computational
Economics (ACE)
According to the research done by Leigh Tesfatsion and her ﬁndings, economies
are complex and dynamic. This implies that there are many agents which in-
teract and those interactions result in the expression of diﬀerent behaviours by
diﬀerent agents. Inﬂuenced by those behaviours, interaction patterns and global
regularities emerge. So it can be followed that interaction of agents and the
emergence of patterns and regularities, which are depending on those interac-
tions, are properties of complex systems. Because agents are also able to adapt
to diﬀerent situations, economies are viewed as adaptive systems, i.e. agents
can react to changes in the environment and also try to inﬂuence it in order
to achieve their goals. To sum up all of the fundamental concepts of complex
systems and agent-based modelling: [15] [20] [23]
Adaptation Individuals are able to adapt to changes in the environment through
selection processes and learning.
Diﬀerence All agents are heterogeneous, i.e. they diﬀer in their behaviour,
beliefs, preferences and appearances.
Externalities Positive and negative externalities are highly able to inﬂuence
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the environment. It is possible that agents create those externalities by
themselves.
Path dependence This signiﬁes that the decision of which path to take at
present always inﬂuences how the future will be shaped.
Geography It is used for the research of location and city formation. By im-
plementing geography to determine with whom it should be possible to
interact in the environment, the output can be inﬂuenced.
Networks Individuals in the simulated world can be connected by certain net-
works which are also possibly represented through geography. There are
many diﬀerent types of networks in the world, e.g. friendship-networks,
electricity networks, the Internet.
Emergence Emergent phenomena are aggregate outcomes that result from in-
dividual actions. Because they are often surprising it is nearly impossible
to predict those aggregate phenomena beforehand. This is merely possible
by observing the agents' behaviours. Peter Howitt states in the Handbook
of Computational Economics [13]
The system as a whole is not a macrocosm of its individual parts
and the parts are not microcosms of the whole.
and he also states some ﬁnding of Schelling in his paper:
...,as Schelling has argued..., macro behaviour can depart radi-
cally from what the individual units are trying to accomplish.
An example of emergence of aggregate behaviour is synchronization which
arises only if the individuals of the environment pay attention to the actions
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taken by all the others. Duncan Watts, Steve Strogatz and Tim Forrest
examined the phenomenon of synchronization by analyzing the chirping of
crickets.
There is no single deﬁnition for complex systems. The only possibility how to
characterize them is to build a level classiﬁcation. [9]
First order complex systems These complex systems just impose energy as
you can observe the imposition of energy on chemical elements in physico-
chemical situations. Modelling techniques are non-linear dynamical and
common dynamical mathematics.
Second order complex systems In this case there already is knowledge in-
volved. Knowledge is representing the building of connections with certain
elements to get energy. By using this knowledge the energy ﬂow can be
inﬂuenced. Experience is responsible for the imposition of knowledge.
Third order complex systems In this system knowledge is not just imposed
but acquired which doesn't result in a mere experience accumulation but
in knowledge involving creativity.
Fourth order complex systems In this case knowledge is interactive in a way
which includes peoples' aspirations and future commitments. These aspi-
rations and commitments are understood by others in the environment.
For the modelling of those previously described systems agent based modeling
(ABM) is used. A speciﬁc feature of agent based computational economics is
the fact that the researchers are ﬁrst building the model. After starting the
simulation it mustn't be inﬂuenced during a run, i.e. the model is dynami-
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cally complete. In other words, after the building process has been ﬁnished the
modeller is just an observer watching the progress of his simulated world. [20]
Agents are comprised of data and methods that guide their behaviour. They
can be private or public. Private data/methods can only be seen by the agents
themselves whereas public data/methods can be seen by all other agents in the
world. Communication is done via public methods. Agent data is consisting of
type attributes (i.e. information of which role an entity plays in the simulation),
structural attributes (i.e. where is the agent situated, cost and utility functions)
and addresses of other agents (i.e. public attributes of other agents). Agent
methods are consisting of behavioural methods that have been derived from
social institutions (e.g. market protocols) and behavioural methods which are
private to the agent (i.e. behavioural strategies like pricing, production and
learning). [20]
Agents can take diﬀerent roles, e.g. individuals like employers or employees, so-
cial groupings like ﬁrms and families, institutions like markets, biological entities
like nature, and physical entities like infrastructure or the weather. According
to the objective of the certain model on the one hand, they are very ﬂexible
in learning, whereas learning is used to ﬁnd certain decisions, and on the other
hand, they haven't got learning capabilities at all. Hierarchies of agents are also
possible, i.e. agents can be assembled through other agents (e.g. a company is
comprised of employees). [20]
Research of agent based computational economics is roughly divided into 4 ob-
jectives. [20]
Empirical understanding This strand of research examines the possibility of
artiﬁcially generating global regularities, which are normally observed in
the real world, by constructing agent based models.
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Normative understanding The objective is to ﬁnd out how eﬃcient and fair
economic designs can be determined by using models with interacting
agents, although those agents are exerting much egoism in their strate-
gical behaviour.
Qualitative insight and theory generation In exploring models and their dy-
namical behaviours by using many diﬀerent initial conditions, modellers
try to gain more insight into the functioning of economic systems.
Methodological advancement In this part it is determined which tools and
methods of investigating economic phenomena are best. Moreover, it is
tried to develop them further. This is also including tools for the testing of
theories which are generated through experiments. The goal is to compare
those theories against data from the real world.
1.1 Learning
Learning models have to be diﬀerent so that they can be used for various situ-
ations of learning in the real world. The baseline of learning is a process used
by all species which are possessing a brain. But this process advances depend-
ing on the certain species and can get more and more complicated and ﬂexible.
The categorisation of learning approaches in economics was highly inﬂuenced by
psychology. [4]
In history the ﬁrst psychological approach is the distinction of classic condi-
tioning and operant conditioning. Operant conditioning is more important to
economic research than classic conditioning. Classic conditioning means that
new stimuli are developed based on existing ones which can then result in a
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variation of preferences. Operant conditioning is based on past experiences and
resembles the reinforcement learning process. It is derived from those ﬁndings
that actions, which are resulting in rewards, are repeated more often in the fu-
ture. Actions, which are resulting in punishment, are gradually stopped. The
next approach is called social-cognitive learning theory. In this case scientists
found out how certain events, which have been previously observed by agents,
and the interactions conducted among those agents have inﬂuenced their learn-
ing process. The last subject is cognitive learning. Using this process, agents
are able to understand coherences and the course of actions/events in the real
world. In the following they are able to create and to express their own opinions.
A recent application of cognitive learning is neuro-science which investigates in-
formation processing speed, stimuli interaction and what parts of the brain are
used for certain processes of learning. [4]
It lasted long that economists weren't very interested in learning issues. When
they started to show more interest, it was for the normative learning model
where the process of learning was described as optimal. Another issue of interest
were models where the behaviour reached its optimum in equilibrium. The next
approach they were interested in was behaviour that did not converge to an
equilibrium but highly diﬀered from it. This divided economists into the ones
that only studied learning reaching an equilibrium of behaviour and the others
that only studied behaviour which was never reaching optimality. After that
many economic researchers developed their own models representing learning
because the traditional approaches weren't suitable for their experiments. Some
of the models became more prominent and more adopted than the other ones. [4]
To get to know which models are best suited for certain applications or exper-
iments it is helpful to classify them. There are multiple ways to do this, e.g.
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classiﬁcation by origin which includes models based on psychology, rationality,
models that are adaptive, models implementing belief learning and artiﬁcial intel-
ligence or biological models. As second possibility you can group them according
to research ﬁelds, e.g. there are certain models used in macroeconomic research,
others used by game theorists etc. The classiﬁcation proposed here by Thomas
Brenner is situation based, i.e. he classiﬁes models according to the utilisation
in diﬀerent situations. [4]
Although there have been more fundamental learning processes deﬁned in other
ﬁelds of research, in reality there exist just two of them. The ﬁrst one is rein-
forcement learning which resembles operant conditioning from psychology, i.e.
this is learning without consideration of the subject to be learned whereas ac-
tions resulting in rewards are repeated more often in the future and actions
resulting in punishment are gradually stopped. The second process involves
conscious consideration on actions and the understanding of interrelationships
in the world which is called cognitive learning. Cognitive learning is further split
into routine-based learning, i.e. subjects learn through observed routines like im-
itation of behaviour, and belief learning/associative learning, i.e. consideration
and belief building of observed behaviour. [4]
1.1.1 Non-Conscious Learning
Every unconscious process of learning is called non-conscious learning. In psy-
chology classic conditioning and operant conditioning are counted among this
classiﬁcation. In economics reinforcement learning is applied but this cannot re-
ally be understood as a process of learning without consideration. It is somehow
resembling the approaches from psychology. Because of that it can be used for
modelling non-conscious learning in that ﬁeld. [4]
7
Models used for this system are the Bush-Mosteller model, melioration learning
and the Roth-Erev model. The principle of melioration learning is that the av-
erage of all past behaviour experiences is taken into consideration. The problem
is that it is not really adequate for modelling non-conscious learning because
reminiscence of past experiences can also include some kind of consideration.
The Bush-Mosteller model and the Roth-Erev model both just consider the cur-
rent situation via a frequency distribution which has been detected in the past
for building a new updated version of the distribution. One diﬀerence between
the two models is that in the Bush-Mosteller model the subjects are able to
forget negative experiences of a certain behaviour from the past, if the type
of behaviour is suddenly getting positive feedback again. On the other hand,
the original Roth-Erev model remembers everything; in an extended version the
feature of oblivion is included. There is also some diﬀerence in the learning
speed whereas the speed is remaining constant in the Bush-Mosteller model and
changes through experience in the Roth-Erev model. The last big diﬀerence lies
in the reception of payoﬀs. The Roth-Erev model is not able to calculate nega-
tive payoﬀs, this characteristic is only implemented in the Bush-Mosteller model.
This is a very important characteristic for modelling reinforcement learning and
so it can be concluded that the Bush-Mosteller model is the only approach really
suited for the modelling of reinforcement learning. [4]
1.1.2 Routine-Based Learning
Using this learning method, behaviour is derived from observations and expe-
riences and it does not include giving an opinion about observed situations.
Models used for this type of learning are models from experimentation, melio-
ration and experience collection, imitation, satisﬁcing, replicator dynamics and
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selection-mutation equation, evolutionary algorithms and at last combined mod-
els. [4]
Experimentation Experimentation is divided into diﬀerent approaches. The
most common one used is the trial-and-error principle. It has to be speciﬁed
how many actions will be tried, after how many attempted actions they
will be called errors and at last the meaning of an error itself has to be
particularized. The core idea is that the subject has to try out some
actions. If they result in something positive, they are repeated in the
future but if they result in something negative, they won't be repeated.
This idea resembles also the idea of reinforcement learning. Thus it can
be seen that reinforcement learning itself cannot only be assigned to non-
conscious learning but also to routine-based learning. The next method
is the principle of S(k)-equilibria which was thought up by Osbourne and
Rubinstein. They state that each action of a set of actions is repeated k
times. After that the subjects calculate the average payoﬀs of these actions
and choose one according to the highest average payoﬀ gained. The last
approach of experimentation is the learning direction theory. In this case
there also exists a set of actions. The subjects in the experiments try to
order them in a way so that they will be able to recognize, which actions
resulted in positive or negative payoﬀs. At last the only actions chosen are
actions which increase their payoﬀ.
Melioration and experience collection Individuals choose their behaviour ac-
cording to experiences and are also able to gain insight into the connection
of similar situations. For this purpose they are accumulating knowledge
from various situations. The only model suited for routine-based learning
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is melioration learning. As mentioned in the previous subsection the pro-
cess of melioration is the calculation of the average utility from all past
experiences of certain actions.
Imitation For this method there doesn't exist any general approach but there
are many diﬀerent applications in economics. There are two possibilities.
First, just a part of the entire population, or second, simply the whole
population is taken into consideration for observation. To determine which
actions should be imitated you can calculate the average payoﬀ of certain
actions or you check, which of the observed crowds have got the highest
payoﬀ, to be able to choose a certain action. A further possibility is to
check your own achieved utility against only one other subject's payoﬀ
at any point in time. Those were just some examples because there are
even more possibilities to choose an action for imitation. Some researchers
also argue that you could take methods for experience collection to model
imitation.
Satisﬁcing The satisﬁcing principle is following the rule of selecting the ﬁrst
observed action that exceeds a certain threshold value of positive payoﬀ.
These threshold values are assigned to every situation by the individual
itself following its expectations. Threshold values united as a whole are
called aspiration level. There have been forged diﬀerent approaches to
initially specify this level. The ﬁrst is that you can specify it to remain
constant over time and second, you can implement it to vary at any point
of time according to some special algorithm.
Replicator dynamics and selection-mutation equation The foundation for
replicator dynamics is evolutionary game theory. This approach is about
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the ﬁtness of behaviours. According to a certain ﬁtness level which is cal-
culated from the average ﬁtness of all behaviours it is decided how often
certain behaviours occur. If the ﬁtness of some behaviour is higher than
the average ﬁtness level this behaviour is used more often; if the ﬁtness is
lower it is used less. The selection-mutation equation is nearly the same as
the principle of replicator dynamics but it is containing a mutation process
as an additional feature.
Evolutionary algorithms Evolutionary algorithms are based on the selection-
mutation equation but they are using a diﬀerent method for the process
of selection and a fundamental description of the subject's evolution. One
diﬃculty of this approach is that the ability to remember past experiences is
very restricted. You also have to diﬀerentiate between genetic algorithms
and evolutionary strategies. Genetic algorithms are coded with binary
values whereas evolutionary strategies are coded with real values. This
diﬀerence has to be taken into account for modelling because mutations
and crossovers have to be treated unequally.
Combined models Although it has been mentioned before that there doesn't
exist any general models for the representation of diﬀerent learning pro-
cesses, there are 2 combined approaches. They are called the Camerer and
Ho's Experienced-Weighted Attraction (EWA) model and the Variation-
Imitation-Decision (VID) model. The EWA model is for both reinforce-
ment and belief learning. Through observation a subject is able to con-
sider the worth of undone actions whereas actions are chosen according to
a logit formulation. The VID model combines all learning processes used
for modelling routine-based learning, i.e. all approaches stated above in
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this subsection except for replicator dynamics, selection-mutation equation
and evolutionary algorithms. Individuals in this model observe certain sit-
uations and behaviours and in this way they accumulate knowledge. But
these accumulated informations are only used to change the behaviour if
there is some dissatisfaction with previously obtained results. If the sub-
jects' behaviours result in positive utility they are remaining the same.
1.1.3 Belief Learning
There is some diﬀerence between belief learning from the point of view of the ﬁeld
of economics and cognitive learning from the point of view of psychology. Belief
learning does not include all the features cognitive learning does. Thomas Bren-
ner includes not only belief learning models in this category but also artiﬁcial
intelligence models, machine learning and rational learning models. [4]
Mental models These models are composed of all informations and beliefs ob-
tained from interaction with a certain environment. The knowledge about
outcomes of certain behaviours is also included. By using this approach a
subject is able to make future predictions. They will choose a behaviour
according to their predictions and according to the consequences that will
arise in the subject's opinion.
Fictitious play Subjects in this model remember everything which has been
performed by all other subjects in the environment. So they are able to
calculate the probability whether a certain action will recur and what be-
haviour will work best in response to other subjects' behaviours. A weak-
ness of this approach is that the adaptation to changes in the environment
is very slow and it is using a lot of resources because every happening of
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the past is recorded. To alleviate the weakness of recording there exists a
modiﬁed version of this model where just a ﬁnite number of past events
is mapped. This modiﬁcation is also speeding up the adaptation process
which is a reaction to changes in the world.
Bayesian learning This approach is treated like a maximization problem. Indi-
viduals try to maximize their expected utility whereas utility is resulting
from certain actions. Individuals assign probabilities of occurrence to each
event. In the initial conﬁguration those probabilities are equal. After gain-
ing more information through the happening of events individuals are able
to update the probabilities.
Least-squares learning This is also an optimization approach like Bayesian
learning. In this model subjects make predictions about dependencies.
These dependencies are consisting of parameters. Subjects compare the
values of predicted and observed parameters and try to minimize the sta-
tistical standard error, i.e. the diﬀerence between estimated and measured
parameter values, when they are squared and summed up, should be min-
imized.
Genetic programming The basis for genetic programming are genetic algo-
rithms. Both approaches are using the same structure, i.e. selection, re-
production, crossover and mutation. The diﬀerence lies within the coded
objects. For genetic algorithms these objects are actions or strategies and
for genetic programming these objects are beliefs about the performance
of the environment. Each belief is represented as a simple program. As in
least-squares learning, predictions and observations are compared and the
same minimization algorithm can be used to choose the programs with the
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best outcome. In the crossover process two of the programs are merged.
The last step is the mutation of the merged programs.
Classiﬁer systems A feature of mankind is that people always try to classify
everything and to put classiﬁed objects in classes. Classiﬁer systems are
working with condition-action rules. This means that a certain action is
conducted if the corresponding condition arises. Each rule has strength
as an attribute. Positive outcomes in the past result in more accumulated
strength. The condition for the selection of an action is choosing the rule
with the highest oﬀered strength. Strength is updated after each round
according to the outcome the rule has achieved. There is no evolution of
new rules but the weakest rules are erased from time to time. To compen-
sate for this deletion new rules are adopted. They are slightly modiﬁed
versions of existing rules.
Neural networks Neural networks are a reproduction of the human brain and its
structures. They are not really adequate for modelling learning processes
because it is unknown how beliefs are built in a human brain and this
approach is too complex. Because of that we are not able to understand
the reasons for behaviour of implemented individuals who are using this
type of model and it is not possible to test the robustness of outcomes
produced by it.
Rule learning This method is based on reinforcement learning. Probabilities,
which are calculated for each belief, are updated by using the algorithm of
this learning approach. The only diﬀerence is that in the original approach
actions are considered instead of rules.
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Stochastic belief learning This approach resembles Bayesian, least-squares
and rule learning. The diﬀerence is that it doesn't take into account all
known beliefs and that each subject only takes into consideration one of
the beliefs at any point in time. Which beliefs are chosen from the given set
depends on the information obtained until the time of selection is reached.
The reception of information is possible via own experiences, observation
and communication. When beliefs are updated some of them disappear
from the set and some new ones are added according to the situations
observed. It is also possible that nothing is changed in the set of beliefs.
1.1.4 Suitability for Applications
Now it is time to consider which model is suitable for which type of application.
It has to be determined whether it is suﬃcient for the agents of the simulation to
learn non-consciously or whether they have to learn consciously. You also have
to distinguish between routine-based learning and belief learning. What also has
to be taken into account is that some of the non-conscious behaviour is due to
local circumstances, i.e. this behaviour has always been like that. An example
for me as an Austrian is to switch on the lights of the car during daylight. I don't
reﬂect on it, I just do it because I learned it that way in driving school. In other
countries this behaviour can be diﬀerent and people may think that it is weird to
switch on the light during day. So for them this would be a conscious decision.
Events resulting from unconscious behaviour that lead to dissatisfaction can also
inspire people to rethink. You can ﬁnd recommendations according to Thomas
Brenner in Figure 1.1. [4]
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1.2 Determination of Interaction Patterns
There are several possibilities to model interactions. The ﬁrst classiﬁcation is
the diﬀerentiation between endogenously and exogenously determined relation-
ships, i.e. if interactions are deﬁned exogenously it is decided by the modeller
with whom individuals have to interact. If they are determined endogenously
the interaction pattern is derived during the run of a simulation, e.g. because
of experience agents have gained through the run. In models with endogenous
interaction patterns the links between agents are updated very fast. This is
happening according to perceived strategies. In models with exogenously deter-
mined interactions the updating is too slow to take into account strategies and
so the interaction pattern in those models can be viewed as given. [22]
According to Nicolaas J. Vriend [22] diﬀerences between models can be due to
1. the establishment of links for technical reasons, e.g. communication and
topology.
2. the establishment and evaluation of links for economic reasons, e.g. learn-
ing process.
3. the existence of a certain game played in the network.
4. the algorithms for decision-making if a game exists, e.g. learning process.
5. the importance of interaction patterns that emerged during a simulation.
6. the importance of game strategies that arose during a certain run.
The modelling of random or local interactions on a lattice is an approach where
interaction patterns are exogenously assessed. For endogenous processes agents
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have to decide themselves what connections to establish. After choosing a certain
connection they also have to decide if the link is maintained for more periods or
if they break it after one usage. [22]
1.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of ACE
Agent based computational economics has many advantages but also disadvan-
tages if you compare it to standard analytical methods for economic research.
But the goal of the computational approach is not to substitute standard ap-
proaches. It shall operate as an accomplishment to older approaches. There
are always some subjects of research where the standard approaches have more
strength than computational approaches and vice versa. [14]
Advantages: [1] [3] [14] [17] [20]
• Every agent has a certain goal. For reaching the goal they are able to
engage in competition or cooperation with others.
• Agents have the capability to learn and to adapt their behaviour, beliefs,
preferences and interaction patterns to a changing environment. So they
are not totally controllable or predictable.
• Agents are very autonomous, i.e. they follow their own goals which can be
inﬂuenced by the environment.
• Modelling of real world aspects is facilitated. You are able to eradicate
many simplifying assumptions that have to be made for standard models.
• Because modelling is not based on the equilibrium approach (i.e. for the
participants of the model the assumption of perfect rationality is intro-
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duced so that they know everything about their surrounding world; they
just manage to ﬁnd resulting equilibria and examine the look of the econ-
omy in equilibrium), it is also possible to build models where equilibria are
not existent (also called perpetual novelty), insoluble or where there may
be multiple equilibria.
• Social communication between entities is possible.
• There are economic phenomena where no general theorems can be applied.
Agent based computational economics is able to deliver some insight into
them.
• Reusability of computational models is very easy (e.g. some other re-
searchers want to do the simulation with diﬀerent parameters).
• Agent based approaches can be used for many disciplines of research be-
cause some of the fundamental problems are similar.
Disadvantages: [14] [20]
• The initial speciﬁcation of the whole model has to be very exact because
after starting the simulation it has to run by itself.
• It has to be tested with many diﬀerent speciﬁcations, i.e. it has to be tested
on robustness because the results could be strongly aﬀected by changes in
the initial speciﬁcation.
• It is not known whether the models will perform well with thousands of
agents.
• It is not easy to validate the results obtained from the simulation against
data obtained from empirical testing.
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• From the results of standard analytical methods theorems can be derived
whereas agent based computational models just produce examples of dif-
ferent outcomes.
To alleviate some of the cited disadvantages there are several possibilities. Be-
cause it is not possible to prove a theorem using the computer you can try to
calculate the probability, if the hypotheses are true, in ﬁnding counterexamples.
You can also use sampling methods and regression methods for testing. [14]
The equilibrium approach is based on equations. For being able to solve them
the modeller has to implement many simplifying assumptions. Agents are ho-
mogeneous and behaviour is displayed by functions of mathematical form. So
it cannot be determined how those assumptions inﬂuence the outcomes of the
models in comparison to the real world. For this purpose computational ap-
proaches can be used. The diﬀerent approaches can be compared and, like it
has been already stated above, the computational approach can be viewed as an
extension of the older standard approaches. [1]
If you compare experiments conducted with human individuals to agent based
simulations, John Duﬀy argues that experimentation using humans is more re-
stricted. So researchers who want to combine these two approaches mostly use
computerized simulations for the explication of results obtained in human sub-
ject experiments. But there is still the question of when it would be better
to use laboratory experiments and of when to use agent based computational
approaches. If outcomes on the individual level are considered human subject
experiments are useful to check external validity of computational approaches.
If outcomes on the aggregate level are examined it is possible to check the results
of laboratory experiments against agent based simulations. In some situations
it can be followed that these two approaches are almost perfect substitutes, i.e.
19
sometimes they can be used in the same way. [8]
Expectations for outcomes in the future of individuals inﬂuence their behaviour
at present. Further on their cumulative individual behaviours result in some ag-
gregate outcome in the future. They try to forecast this result and this inﬂuences
future results, i.e. this process is self-referential. For the purpose of handling ex-
pectations of many agents, static economic theory has developed the approach
of rational expectations. It states how to choose an expectational model for
getting a deﬁnitive result but this approach is not very useful to represent re-
ality. An approach that didn't have that many unreal assumptions is bounded
rationality. It was developed by Herbert Simon more than 50 years ago. But
the problem with that one is that there are too many possibilities how to relax
the assumptions of rational expectations theory. It is not feasible to determine
which assumptions would be right and which would be wrong. For real world
representation a generative approach is more useful. [23] [1]
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Figure 1.1: Recommendations for choosing a learning model [4]
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2 Characterization of the
research problem
In this chapter the diﬀerent parts of the problem are introduced. It starts with
the use of simulations and which analysis can be conducted using them. Next a
network overview is given. This includes the diﬀerent representations of structure
and also historic approaches are considered, until reaching the theory about
small worlds and social structure. Further on some insight into game theory is
delivered.
2.1 Simulations
Simulations in this context are meant to be computational programs using cer-
tain initial speciﬁcations. They are running self-reliantly whereas the modeller
is able to observe deﬁnitive results. Those results can be used for [2]
Prediction By taking present conditions as initial speciﬁcations simulations are
able to generate predictions for future outcomes.
Performance Simulations are also used for various assignments, e.g. diagnosis
for medical purposes, recognition of speech.
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Training In reproducing an existing world it is possible to provide training for
individuals.
Entertainment Games representing reality are developed (e.g. ﬂight simula-
tions) for the entertainment of people.
Education Some developed computer games also serve as educational devices
(e.g. Sim City) because people are able to observe eﬀects of their behaviour
and of introduced policies.
Proof Simulations are able to act as a proof of existence for given situations.
Discovery They are also implemented to detect the coherence between relation-
ships and principles.
2.1.1 Analysis Using Simulations
To perform analysis with simulations you can divide the process into three main
steps. First you have to program the model, then you have to analyze the
resulting data and at last you have to publish the results so that others are able
to work with them or to review them. Another important thing is to replicate
given simulations. [2]
For the programming it is important to follow certain principles. Programming
has to be valid in generating the results, i.e. results mustn't be inﬂuenced by bugs
in the code. Next it has to be usable, which means that everyone should be able
to understand it. After that everybody should be able to give an interpretation
of its results. Extendability shall ascertain that the code can be used by others
for the creation of an extended version. It should also be possible to use the
program for other purposes. It is very important that a programming language
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is chosen which has already some simulation features and which can easily be
used by the majority of people, who are involved in studies like that. [2]
As already mentioned in the ﬁrst chapter the data, which results from a run of
the simulation, incorporates path dependency, i.e. events occurring in the past
can absolutely inﬂuence the resulting data. Because of that many runs using
the same initial conditions have to be executed to be able to state, whether
the outcome is a standard one or not. The model can be tested with many
diﬀerent initial speciﬁcations. This renders it possible to study many diﬀerent
aspects. The eﬀects of the parameter changing can also be researched using
statistical approaches. For quantitative changes regression analysis is used and
for qualitative changes analysis of variance is taken. [2]
For sharing the simulation with others the ﬁrst step is to publish it in a mag-
azine to attract the interest of other researchers. Due to the fact that it is not
possible to write every detail into an article it is necessary to write a completed
documentation including the source code, a model description and instructions,
how to run and interpret its results. [2]
The replication of simulation is a subject which is often neglected in the analysis
of simulations. But it is important to see whether the results, which have been
obtained by a previous researcher, can be reproduced by using other simulation
environments. As Axelrod states here [2] he and his colleagues can derive some
important lessons from their project of replication.
1. Replication can be executed very fast and easily.
2. You have to consider the level of replication
a) Numerical equivalence, i.e. all results are the same which is only
possible using the same initial speciﬁcation and generator of random
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numbers.
b) Distributional equivalence, i.e. there is no diﬀerence in statistical
analysis with the same mean values and standard deviations.
c) Relational equivalence, i.e. the results of the simulations have the
same shape or characteristic.
3. For the testing of distributional equivalence you have to take a sample size
that is large enough. Otherwise it could be possible that the null hypothe-
ses (i.e. that the values are equivalent in this sense) is never rejected.
4. If there is just a little diﬀerence between the conﬁguration of the origi-
nal and the replicated simulation this can inﬂuence the result so that no
distributional equivalence is attained.
2.2 Structure
To be able to perform a better study of the inﬂuence of interactions and to
determine who the individuals are, that evoke this inﬂuence between agents in
an environment, networks are used. This is because their presence in a simulation
can have severe impacts on the behaviour of individuals. Furthermore, it can be
stated that in this case mathematical theory has too many restrictions, because
networks can become very complex; the same is true for empirical studies. So
agent based computational models are used. [26]
In earlier times networks were just viewed as ﬁxed but in reality they are more
complicated. Networks are structures wherein the nodes are generating some-
thing like power, data or behaviour. The structure itself is evolving and changing
over time. The network setup inﬂuences everything which is happening. Every
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diﬀerent discipline of science has its own form of doing network research. Now
a point in time is reached where all the best features of all disciplines have to
be combined to understand all the implications of network science. This is not
an easy task because each of the disciplines has a diﬀerent manner of expressing
similar topics. So researchers have to learn in advance how to communicate and
how to understand each other. [23]
2.2.1 History of Network Science
To study the interrelationship of communication networks, Paul Erdös and his
colleague Alfred Rényi developed the theory of random graphs. Links in a ran-
dom graph are determined randomly. If there are enough concatenations all the
nodes in the graph are connected with each other, i.e. you are able to reach any
node from any starting point. This type is called a connected graph. But how
many bonds have to exist until the graph gets connected? The answer to this
question was given by those two researchers. They stated that, if the average
number of connections per node was less than one, the graph wasn't connected
at all. The outcome here was that you could ﬁnd many isolated groupings of
nodes. But once the number of an average of 1 connection per node was reached,
a critical point had been hit. Suddenly the fraction of connected nodes rose very
fast. They called that phenomenon phase transition which can be seen in Figure
2.1. But there was a problem with this approach as soon as it was compared
to real world networks, because then they were able to see that real networks
weren't built at random. [23]
The mathematician Anatol Rapoport asked himself the same question as Erdös
and Rényi did. After having found similar results he tried to deal with prob-
lems concerning random graph theory. Two nodes which are connected via a
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Figure 2.1: Random graph connectivity [23]
link build a relationship (i.e. a dyad). If individuals belonging to 2 diﬀerent
dyads shared a node, Rapoport stated, it was very likely that the 2 other nodes,
which were strangers previously, also got to know each other. So they built a
conﬁguration that Rapaport called `triadic closure'. In this theory dynamic evo-
lution of networks was taken into account. This had been the new insight of the
triad structure of networks. Basic theory of triads was already developed by a
German sociologist called Simmel 50 years earlier. The approach of Rapoport
was the ﬁrst departure from pure random theory but still some properties of it
remained. So he called the resulting structure `random-biased nets'. But the
problem was that he couldn't determine a proof or a usage for his modelling
approach because of the mathematical and experimental limitations of his time.
So it vanished for some time. The only thing he could verify was that it was also
possible to develop longer cycles, if triads evolved in a network. [23]
There were researchers from other disciplines that examined nearly the same
questions like physicists, but they chose another direction to start from. Soci-
ologists tried to understand the network structure in order to determine social
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role patterns of individual players and the group. Physicists however tried to
understand what macro behaviour/properties can emerge from micro behaviour/
properties, if all individuals in the network had perfect knowledge of their envi-
ronment. They found out that at a critical point no center or central authority in
the network was needed for universal organization of behaviour. Synchronization
could be reached via some random events that were rather small. Those events
would have never inﬂuenced the overall outcome under conditions of normality.
This happened, because actions were viewed as operations that could be seen
throughout the whole system, although they took place just locally. This ﬁnding
could be interpreted as another version of phase transition which was applied
for magnetism, freezing of liquids etc. The conclusion reached was that diﬀer-
ent disciplines with highly diﬀerent topics of research could have very similar
characteristics when complex systems were considered. [23]
2.2.2 Choice of Various Networks
In this section following the arguments of Allen Wilhite we just take ﬁxed or
stable networks into account. Normally networks that exist in the real world
are evolving over time; so it may not seem to be an adequate assumption for
modelling to view them as stable and unchanging. But if it is considered that
evolution is working very slowly, this fact may seem more appropriate. The
graphs considered in this section only feature undirected links. No node can
have a link with itself (i.e. it is simple). Any node is reachable from any starting
point (i.e. the graph is connected) and all edges occupy the same value (i.e. they
are unweighted). [26]
The complete network (Figure 2.2) In this graph there exists a connection
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between each of the nodes. The calculation of the number of edges is
very simple because it is following the sequence of triangular numbers.
Triangular numbers are binomial coeﬃcients. For the calculation of the
number of edges you have to sum up n nodes from 1 to n. [24]
Xn =
n∑
k=1
k =
n ∗ (n+ 1)
2
=
 n+ 1
2
 (2.1)
Figure 2.2: The complete network [26]
The star (Figure 2.3) One node is connected to all the other ones but the
other nodes themselves aren't linked.
The ring (Figure 2.4) In this network each node has a connection with just
a few neighbours, not with all other nodes in the network. If you take for
example a ring with 8 nodes, each node is linked with 4 other nodes.
The grid (Figure 2.5) The grid is looking like a chessboard where nodes are
situated at each crossing.
The tree (Figure 2.6) The tree network has a hierarchical character. One
node is sitting on the top and this node has a few branches which also
have branches and so forth.
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Figure 2.3: The star network [26]
Figure 2.4: The ring network [26]
Small-world network (Figure 2.7) Small world networks are ﬁrst deﬁned
through path length. This is stated by Wilhite [26] as
the average number of edges that must be traversed to get from
one node to any other node
. Second they are deﬁned through the amount of clustering. This is deﬁned
by Wilhite [26] as
the degree of the graph or the average number of edges con-
nected to each node
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Figure 2.5: The grid network [26]
Figure 2.6: The tree network [26]
. For this type of networks the clustering level has to be high and the path
length has to be very small.
Power network (Figure 2.8) These networks are also dubbed scale-free net-
works. They have some single nodes that act as hubs (i.e. hubs have many
nodes which are connected to them) and a large number of nodes which
only have a small number of links. The distribution of these nodes is a
power law distribution.
[26]
The topic we want to investigate here is how diﬀerent network topologies inﬂu-
ence behaviour of individuals in the simulation. Examples are cooperation and
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Figure 2.7: The small-world network [26]
Figure 2.8: The power network [26]
coordination which are behavioural patterns that are often displayed by pris-
oner's dilemma games from game theory. The utility an individual gains from
a certain behaviour (e.g. coordination and cooperation respectively and on the
other side defection) is measured. [26]
2.2.3 Small-Worlds
For the development of a model that represents the small world phenomenon
Steve Strogatz and Duncan Watts think that it has to incorporate 4 basic fea-
tures. First there shall be several groups where the nodes have many connections
between themselves (e.g. circles of strong friendship). There shall also exist a few
links between diﬀerent groups (e.g. some people have friends of diﬀerent groups
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whereas it is not very likely that they are connected in a stronger way). Second
the network representation has to be dynamic, i.e. it has to evolve over time.
Third there are diﬀerent probabilities for the establishment of new connections.
These are inﬂuenced by the connections at present (e.g. you are introduced to a
friend of your friends you didn't know before). At last new links can be estab-
lished which are only depending on innate preferences. They are not built via
already existing links (e.g. decision of changing your workplace or the town where
you are living). Decisions we take or behaviour we perform because of our own
preferences and abilities are called `agency' in sociology. Decisions/Behaviour
that are/is just aﬀected by the social structure, which can be found around us,
is called `structure'. Behaviour dependent on agency isn't really random but
it appears to be. So it is possible to model it using a random network theory
approach. But the evolution of relationships which is dependent on structure
is constrained by already existent connections. Those 2 features are conﬂicting
and a trade-oﬀ between them has to be imposed. So to lay on more weight
on either one of these two is a hard thing to determine. To solve this problem
the 2 researchers started with the features' extremes and tried to ﬁll the void
in between. They developed the `alpha model' which can be expressed mathe-
matically through an equation. In this equation a single introduced parameter
alpha is changed from zero to inﬁnity. The parameter states the probability of
shortcuts in the network which is not known from the beginning; this was a ﬁnd-
ing after the development of a second modelling version. If alpha is 0 then all
newly built links in the network are established via the social structure. When
it reaches inﬁnity the connections are totally established at random (see Figure
2.9). [23]
The thought of this approach resembles the model of Rapoport but in this case
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Figure 2.9: Interaction rules for diﬀerent values of alpha [23]
the researchers weren't restricted in testing. They could make use of computers
to test their complex system. They tested the model with a high clustering
coeﬃcient and short path length. So they saw that at the extreme of alpha
being 0 there was a high clustering coeﬃcient. At the point where alpha was
reaching inﬁnity there were very short path lengths. But it didn't look like those
two properties could exist both at the same time. Computer testing taught them
otherwise. Results show that path length is low at both extremes of alpha. At
ﬁrst it rises but when it reaches a critical value the disconnected circles of people
get connected. After that path length shrinks again. This can also be viewed
as a phase transition like in the approach of Erdös and Rényi. The clustering
coeﬃcient is very high for low values of alpha. It reaches its maximum after
some time of increasing alpha. Then it is plummeting very fast. Intentionally
you would say that the phase transitions of these two features occur at the
same value of alpha. But computer experiments show that the path length is
already shrinking even before the clustering coeﬃcient reaches its maximum.
The resulting curves can be seen in Figure 2.10. The blue part represents the
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region of networks having small-world properties. [23]
Figure 2.10: Path length and clustering coeﬃcient for diﬀerent values of alpha
[23]
In this representation it is only possible to have, on the one hand, many frag-
mented circles of connected people. On the other hand, there is just one big
network where everybody can be reached. In reality social networks seem to be
divided into more than one large component. The next topic of research was
to get to know the causes for the small-world phenomenon. For this purpose
another model was developed and dubbed `beta model' as a second approach to
better understand small-world networks. They used periodic lattices, i.e. lattices
where the edges are connected so that there is a passage from one edge to the
other, to represent ordered interactions. Another element were random networks
as representation for disordered networks. Once again those two versions were
the extremes and the researchers tried to determine the stages in between. As in
the alpha model a parameter was introduced, now called beta. Starting point (i.e.
beta is zero) is a one-dimensional lattice which looks like a circle. The nodes of
this circle only have connections to their two neighbours whereas the neighbours
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also have a link between themselves. If beta is between zero and one it represents
the probability that a link in the network is taken and rewired to another node.
For this purpose every connection of the network is considered. If the parameter
is one then the resulting network is a random graph. The transition of beta
from zero to one can be seen in Figure 2.11. The rewiring of connections in the
network creates a shorter path length but the clustering coeﬃcient is still high.
Those features are once again the characteristics of a small-world network. But
as it can be seen in Figure 2.11 only few rewiring-steps are needed to generate a
large impact on the path length whereas the clustering coeﬃcient in comparison
has a rather slow descent. [23]
Figure 2.11: Path length and clustering coeﬃcient for diﬀerent values of beta [23]
A characteristic those two models have in common is the fact that individuals
aren't aware of the whole world. They are just able to recognize their connec-
tions to close friends in a circle. This is an important attribute if you consider
disease spreading, spreading of computer viruses or the search of information in
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organizations. Another important ﬁnding of Watts and Strogatz is that small-
world networks can be found in all types of network systems and not just in
social ones. This allowed them to ﬁnd data for testing more easily. The ancient
problem was that it was impossible for the representation of social relations to
ﬁnd enough and not falsiﬁed data. So when there was the possibility of taking
any networked structure, which had been well documented, the problem was
resolved. One of the examples is the so-called `Kevin Bacon Game'. It is taking
a movie database from the internet as a footing, where it was recorded which
actors played in which ﬁlms. The game starts with the actor Kevin Bacon and
ﬁnds out what path length is between any other actor and him during a runtime
. This example was also extended to determine the average path length between
a number of 225,000 actors. The result of average path length obtained was
about 4 and the clustering coeﬃcient was at 79 %. The experiment was also
conducted using networks which had not much to do with social networks (e.g.
electronic transmission network, neural network of an organism). All of them
also had the characteristics of small world networks. However, if you consider
any other innate properties they are totally diﬀerent. [23]
2.2.4 Distribution of Network Ties
Watts and Strogatz forgot about one important topic in their research, namely
which probability distribution of the number of connections any node has is
forming the basis of the network. They just assumed that the distribution was
shaped like a normal distribution. The normal distribution has one maximum
signifying the average and there are steep descents on both sides of the it. The
descents show that there aren't many diﬀerent numbers of neighbouring nodes.
The most nodes have the average number of neighbours (see Figure 2.12). [23]
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Figure 2.12: Normal distribution of probability of k neighbours [23]
But the two scientists Albert-László Barabási and Réka Albert considered this
ﬂaw in the research of Watts and Strogatz. The distribution of random graphs
always looks like a Poisson distribution which resembles a normal distribution.
So that diﬀerence wasn't of much concern but Barabási and Albert found out that
many networks in the real world have a completely diﬀerent looking distribution,
the power law distribution (see Figure 2.13). The power law distribution has a
diﬀerent shape than the normal distribution. The maximum does not form an
average value, the curve starts at the maximum and decreases very fast until a
certain point is reached. After that point the fall of the curve is not as rapid as
before but is going on until it has reached inﬁnity. [23]
The interpretation of ﬁgure 2.13 is that networks which have power law dis-
tribution have a few nodes with many connections to others (also called hubs),
and many nodes that just have a few connections to others. As an example you
could take the existing network of airports. On the one hand, there are some big
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Figure 2.13: Power law distribution of probability of k neighbours [23]
airports in big cities that are directly connected all over the world. On the other
hand, there are many small airports with just a few links, mostly connected to
hubs. For networks that have this distribution it is not appropriate to calculate
an average value and to state that this is the only value which counts for most
points in the network. In reality the hubs have strong inﬂuence on this value.
If you take the example of the distribution of wealth among the population in
a certain country few people are very rich and most people are located in the
`middle class'. After calculating the average wealth the average is far too high
for most people because the result is highly inﬂuenced by the rich ones. [23]
In thinking about the network of airports as having a power-law distribution
Barabási and Albert also reached the conclusion that these networks didn't have
limitations as had networks with normal or Poisson distributions. They didn't
have a limit on how many links a certain node could have which gave those net-
works the name `scale-free networks'. Many networks exhibit the characteristics
of being scale-free, like the World Wide Web considering the structure of its
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links. Also the network of movie actors mentioned in the previous sub-clause
can be added to them. The next ﬁnding concerning this type of networks was
the fact that it was possible that they self-developed. In the beginning of the
evolution of a network structure there exists the same probability for each node
to get connected to another one of the nodes. When new ones are added over
time, it can be seen that the younger nodes have some disadvantage. The older
ones have higher probability to get new links to the others. After enough time
the distribution of the network is changing from a degree distribution to a power-
law distribution. Taking the previous example of wealth in a society it can be
seen that it is far more easy for rich people to get richer than for average people
to become rich. To sum up every network can become scale-free if it has the
features of being a growing network and if it exhibits a higher probability for
the formation of new connections by nodes which have already many bonds to
other ones. [23]
One problem of the last ﬁnding is that it is only valid for inﬁnite networks.
Because every network in the real world is ﬁnite also scale-free networks have
a certain point where the characteristic of being scale-free ends. But it is not
sure whether this is because of a ﬁnite network or because of the fact that this
is a property inherited by the network. This is like the potential of individuals
only to be able to maintain a certain number of friendships. It can be followed
that in the real world it is impossible to always uphold scale-free properties of
networks because links are holding costs. Due to this fact it is not possible to
extend networks to inﬁnity. [23]
The next thing Watts and Strogatz had to accomplish in their research was the
inclusion of social structure. Scale-free models do not incorporate this from the
beginning. Social structure signiﬁes how close or far away the single nodes are
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from each other. The two men followed an approach of Harrison White, who was
in the ﬁrst place a physicist and then also graduated in sociology. He stated that
individuals formed groups with others who did the same things. He called these
activities contexts whereas contexts were constituting the structure of networks.
Watts and Strogatz deﬁned the distance in networks between any nodes using
the contexts of Harrison White. They decided that individuals who shared many
contexts were very close and individuals who only shared a few or no contexts
had a larger distance between themselves. So they followed that you had to
consider two diﬀerent structures. On the one hand, the structure of the network
itself and, on the other hand, the social structure. [23]
Because they thought of this topic to be too complicated for themselves alone
they gathered a new member for their research group, Mark Newman. They
created a network called aﬃliation network which served to show the social
structure of networks. Instead of being made up of a single type of nodes (in
the following called unipartite or single-mode networks) it was comprised of two
diﬀerent versions of nodes and was called a bipartite or two-mode network. Only
diﬀerent types of nodes could be linked. An example was a network consisting of
actors and the movies they appeared in. The ﬁrst type of nodes were actors and
the second type were movies. If an actor appeared in a certain movie a link was
drawn from the actor to the movie. It was possible for actors to be in multiple
movies and, vice versa, it was possible for movies to have multiple actors. Uni-
partite networks only had a single distribution underlying their nodes. Bipartite
networks incorporated 2 distributions, e.g. the number of actors belonging to
one movie and the number of movies each of the actors appeared in. As can be
seen in Figure 2.14 a bipartite aﬃliation network can be split into two unipartite
networks, e.g. two of the actors are linked if they are in the same movie and
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two of the movies are linked if a certain actor is acting in both of them. The
network which represents the actors' relationships is called aﬃliation network.
The one which represents the connections in movies is called interlock network.
The scientists discovered that if a bipartite network was built completely at
random from the two unipartite networks it still showed all the features of a
small-world network. By using this approach it was possible to demonstrate
the network's dynamics and the development of structure regarding social and
networking facets. [23]
Figure 2.14: Aﬃliation network [23]
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2.2.5 Spatial Models
.
In a spatial environment it is possible for the individuals to move. It can also
be seen as a structure for interactions. All spatial models should be able to run
in aspatial conditions to be able to compare what behaviours and results can be
derived from initial speciﬁcations of the model and what can be derived from
their interaction structure. In spatial models there are also additional costs, e.g.
costs for shipping between the diﬀerent nodes of the network. [7]
2.2.6 Social Structure
Social structure is inﬂuencing outcomes of economic processes, but why? One
reason for that is that people rather tend to believe other people they know
personally. Punishment and rewards also are more eﬀective when carried out by
known individuals. The last reason is the trust that someone who has strong
incentives to do things amiss for the community only for getting some reward
for himself is doing the other thing which is better for all of them. [12]
There are four core principles that have been developed by sociologists. [12]
Norms and network density Norms are deﬁned as thought regulations for
good behaviour which are common in the network. The strength of these
norms is highly depending on the density of the underlying network. If
the network has higher density the norms are stronger and if it has lower
density they are weaker. The reason for this is that, with more density,
norms are discussed more frequently. So behaviour that does not ﬁt in is
more easily encountered for the imposition of some punishment. The more
punishment is noticed by so called free-riders (i.e. individuals that want
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to gain just the reward for themselves and because of that work against
the community) the less is the free-riders' occurrence. But it cannot be
followed that the networks are more dense if they are bigger. If they get
too large people will not be able to maintain many links to others for the
keeping of high density.
The strength of weak ties Ties in the social network can be strong or weak.
This represents the closeness of people who know each other. Strong ties
are kept with close friends and weak ties are upheld with acquaintances
that aren't very close. The funny thing here is that it is easier to get
new informations through weak ties. This phenomenon arises due to the
probability that your close friends are also close to your other close friends.
This signiﬁes that they build a circle where it is hard to get recent news
because everyone residing in this circle has the same status of information.
So you have to get new information through a weak tie that is connected
to another circle which has diﬀerent news to oﬀer. An example for this is
that it is often easier to get a new job through information received by an
acquaintance than through information received by a close friend because
it is very likely that you already know everything your friend can tell you.
Summarized information diﬀusion in a social network is highly depending
on weak ties.
The importance of `structural holes' This is some extension of the argument
of weak ties. It states that ties which are connected to many diﬀerent
friendship circles in the network gain an important advantage for their
possessors. Their possessors are able to exploit the `structural holes' oﬀered
by those weak ties.
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The interpenetration of economic and non-economic action This can also
be stated as the dependence of economic actions on non-economic actions
or institutions. This phenomenon only arises when those actions are mixed.
This is called `social embeddedness' by Granovetter. One negative exam-
ple is corruption. A positive one is ﬁnding a job by means of friends or
acquaintances.
After the examination of various models and real world occurrences it is possible
to make a classiﬁcation of three diﬀerent structures. The ﬁrst one is the structure
where interaction circles have hardly any connections between them, i.e. they
are decoupled. In this situation, if interests are very diﬀerent, the structure has
not much inﬂuence on the collective outcome. A structure with a few weak ties
has more cooperation but tends to be inﬂuenced by a single powerful entity; with
many weak ties there is also a lot of cooperation but in this conﬁguration it is
hard for one entity to exercise that much power to achieve coordination from a
central position. [11]
2.3 Game Theory and Social Dilemmas
Why do individuals cooperate although they always have very strong incentives
not to do it? Some factors that are playing along this question are, considering
resources, not to use all of them until destruction is faced. This is mostly reg-
ularized by rules which are established by authorities and by trust between the
particular agents. But authorities also have the ability to defect. [16]
Cooperation is a characteristic of trust between individuals in a way that they are
able to overcome social dilemmas if there is a certain amount of trust established
between them. Because of that it is possible that people adopt a strategy where
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the result is not optimal for themselves. But it is good for the community
in order to achieve better outcomes than others who act rather egoistic. This
phenomenon is dubbed the `paradox of rationality'. It is also important to take
distrust into account because it is just the other side of trust. It can also have
deep impact on the behaviour of people. Cooperation is also highly depending
on relationships between individuals, on past events and on the structure of the
network. As it was already mentioned in the previous section the density of
networks plays an important role. Collective action in the network would also
be diﬃcult if the single groupings weren't connected trough weak ties. [11]
At the beginning there is no information available who you can trust in an
environment. This is learned throughout the progression of time. To have some
insurance from the beginning it is possible to build safeguards against defection.
These two possibilities which are standing vis-à-vis incorporate a certain trade-
oﬀ. Researchers argue about which one of the both approaches is more costly,
to gather information or to protect from the beginning. [21]
2.3.1 Game Theory
Using game theory, which is a mathematical application, researchers in various
ﬁelds of sciences try to ﬁnd out which behaviour and respectively interactions
people follow in certain competitive situations. The most important point here is
the process of reaching decisions. The ﬁrst approach was built by John von Neu-
mann who also published a book on this topic together with Oskar Morgenstern
in 1944. This early version of game theory was about games between 2 individ-
uals which played zero-sum games. Traditionally, the games should determine
equilibria. The elements of a game are the agents playing, the strategies which
can be executed and the payoﬀs which are received when a certain strategy is
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played. The payoﬀs can also be seen as the utility from which the players are
able to beneﬁt. Their goal in the games is to maximize payoﬀs. [10] [19] [25]
2.3.1.1 Game Types and Game Representations
Zero- and non-zero-sum games In zero-sum games the sum of the payoﬀ in-
dividuals are able to receive is always zero. So if one of the players wins,
then the other one has to lose and vice versa. In non-zero-sum games this
is not the case; the result of the overall payoﬀ can be any number.
Cooperative and non-cooperative games Cooperative games have the fea-
ture that agents can make agreements. In this case it is compulsory to
stick to them. In non-cooperative games cheating is possible although
arrangements are made.
Symmetric and asymmetric games In symmetric games the payoﬀs do not
depend on the individuals themselves but only on the strategies which are
selected to be played. One example is the prisoner's dilemma. Although
normally there are diﬀerent payoﬀs and strategies for the players in asym-
metric games it is still possible for the players to have equal strategies.
Simultaneous and sequential games In the case of simultaneous games the
individuals do not know, when choosing their strategies, what strategies
the game partners have chosen. In sequential games every player knows
what actions were taken previously.
Games with perfect and imperfect information In games with perfect infor-
mation the individuals can remember exactly which actions were taken in
the previous steps by all the others. This is one of the most simple ap-
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proaches in game theory. It is not possible to have perfect information
in simultaneous games. Games with imperfect information can have both
sequential and simultaneous activities. A diﬀerent case is complete infor-
mation where just the strategies and payoﬀs of the others are known but
none of the things that happened during the game.
Inﬁnite games These are the games which are going on endlessly, i.e. the turns
of actions are never coming to an end.
Discrete and continuous games In the case of a certain number of individuals
playing, a certain number of strategies and actions taken you are talking
about a discrete game. Continuous games for example are the ones with
the possibility to select a certain strategy out of a continuous number of
strategies.
Extensive Form This representation is looking like a graphical tree (see ﬁgure
2.15). The nodes are points where individuals can choose their strategies.
The root is usually the point where player number 1 chooses his strategy,
the nodes one level down are for the second player etc. At the footing of
the tree you can ﬁnd the payoﬀs. This form is usually designed for showing
games with sequential course.
Normal Form In this case the representation is looking like a matrix (see ﬁgure
2.16). The payoﬀs are denoted in the ﬁelds. The ones for the rows are
cited as the ﬁrst digit and the ones for the columns are cited as the second.
The chosen strategies of the players are represented by rows and columns.
Each of the players is appearing either in the rows or the columns. This
form is usually designed for games with simultaneous actions.
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Figure 2.15: Extensive Form [25]
Function Form In the case of functions the payoﬀ for each action which is
chosen is calculated from a given function. So the payoﬀs possible to be
earned aren't known beforehand.
[19] [25]
2.3.1.2 Prisoner's Dilemma
The prisoner's dilemma usually is a game with 2 participants and 2 possible
strategies. It is named like that because the paradigm, which forms the basis
of this approach, was about two individuals that had been arrested. There was
not enough proof to convict them of the serious crime they really had conducted
but there was enough for proving a minor one. Because the authorities wanted
to get them for the more serious misdeed they were providing them with a few
possibilities to choose from. If one of them was admitting that they did it
and the other one was not, the ﬁrst one would be free and the second would
be imprisoned for a high number of years (possibility 1). If both were giving
in then both would go to prison for less time than in the previous possibility
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Figure 2.16: Normal Form [25]
(possibility 2). If none of them was confessing they would be in prison for the
minor charges of the other crime (possibility 3) which was less time than in the
case with both criminals giving in. This course of events can be pictured like
in ﬁgure 2.17. A payoﬀ of zero represents the worst situation, a payoﬀ of one
stands for possibility 2, a payoﬀ of 2 is a representation for possibility 3 and
the highest payoﬀ is gained for being free after choosing the ﬁrst possibility. Of
course this is modelled as a simultaneous game so that the players don't know
the decision of their partners beforehand. [19]
In the following research included in this thesis this form of game-playing is
used for the determination of trading partners. In this case the agents gain or
lose via their conducted trades. They have to choose between the strategies of
cooperation and defection.
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Figure 2.17: Normal Form of the Prisoner's Dilemma [19]
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3 Research Problem in
Simulation
In the following chapter you can ﬁnd a detailed description of the simula-
tion which was taken as a medium for being able to get results for this re-
search. Anybody who is interested in more detail and also wants to study the
code of the simulation can ﬁnd details on the homepage of Leigh Tesfatsion
(http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htm).
There are several reasons for choosing this simulation. This is an approach which
incorporates some of the characteristics which have been described in chapters
1 and 2. In this case a genetic algorithm is used as the method for learning.
Furthermore, the selection of trading partners is determined endogenously. This
means that the agents themselves identify their partners via the payoﬀ which
can be expected in an interaction. After a certain trading partner is accepted
the interaction itself takes place as a prisoner's dilemma. The program oﬀers a
very detailed documentation which makes it easier to understand the code. The
simulation builds networks through the interaction of agents. The links which
are established are written into the output. From the output you are able to
study the building process of these networks. Another display of the output is
the behaviour of the agents; they can show cooperation or defection. The last
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important output is the readout of all payoﬀs which are received by the individual
traders in each of their trading interactions. The code of the simulation can be
downloaded from the internet and is already fully executional. You can choose
between diﬀerent versions of development. For this research I chose a simple
approach without any graphical user interface. The output is written in lists
where you are able to ﬁnd the important details mentioned in the previous lines.
It is also certain that the program has already gone through many tests. So you
can be rather sure that the major ﬂaws have already been determined. Therefore
the output becomes more trustable.
3.1 Framework for the Simulation
As a framework for the simulation program, SimBioSys is used. This framework
has been developed by David McFadzean for biological simulations and was his
thesis to reach a master's degree. The program is comprised of several diﬀerent
classes. The classes used in the trade network game are derived from the ones
developed in this approach.
3.1.1 SimBioSys Framework
The original purpose for designing and developing this class framework was to
use it for the modelling of evolutionary biological systems, e.g. sexual selec-
tion/reproduction. The modelling of biological systems includes the choice of
the most suitable learning algorithm to consider diﬀerent features. Using the
SimBioSys framework it is possible to implement genetic algorithms, genetic
programming, evolutionary programming, cellular automata, neural networks,
neuronal networks and artiﬁcial life/intelligence. So it can be followed that you
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are able to build many diﬀerent simulations which represent activities that ap-
pear in the real world. [18]
As can be seen in Figure 3.1 the framework consists mostly of abstract base
classes. It is not possible to create instances from these base classes. They
provide objects and functions for their subclasses which can be instantiated and
extended. [18]
On the top of all classes is the class bioObject. Among classes of the SimBioSys
framework, the classes bioSimulation, bioWorld, bioPopulation, bioThing, bio-
Program and bioGType are derived from bioObject. They inherit all data and
methods from this class. The only class derived from bioObject which is not
designed for the basic framework is bioList. It is responsible for the storage
and manipulation of instances which are generated from the subclasses of bioOb-
ject. The class bioObject itself has the duty to keep free space for the data and
methods which belong to all its subclasses. [18]
bioSimulation stores a pointer to an instance of bioWorld and several instances
of bioPopulation. It acts as a counter for cycles in the simulation and it is able to
activate simulation cycles. In the default implementation action cycles are just
executed until the default implementation is overridden. The action cycle invokes
the method NextStep() for the bioWorld instance. After that the counter for the
number of action cycles is incremented. When the breeding cycle is entered, an
invocation of the method Breed() is sent to all bioPopulation instances. As the
next step the counter for the breeding cycle is also manipulated. In the case of
the simulation, which is researched in this thesis, the environment cycle changes
only internal counters for the diverse cycles except for the breeding cycle. [18]
The class bioWorld monitors all objects which belong to the environment and it is
responsible for the execution of action cycles. Because of that it also handles the
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perception of the local environment and the determination of intentions which
both belong to instances of bioThing. It stores a list of all instances of bioThing
and an extra list of instances that are already dead in the simulation but not
yet deleted. It incorporates methods for the setting and manipulation of the
positions of bioThing instances situated in the world. There are also methods
for the removal and deletion of those instances. The execution of the action cycle
(i.e. method NextStep()) starts with the copying of all stored bioThing instances
into a local list (i.e. instance of bioList). Then the system tells those instances
to get their perception of the local environment. After that it translates those
perceptions into intentions and ﬁnally deletes all the things that are already
situated in the list of dead instances. [18]
A subclass of bioWorld is bioCellWorld which implements all methods from
bioWorld that are only deﬁned there. It stores a representation of the world.
This representation can be comprised of the number of cells and the size of the
window where the world is situated, etc. There are methods for the creation of
an empty world with predetermined size, for the setting of instances of bioThing
to an appointed position, for the removal of such an instance and the ﬁnding of
a free cell for an instance if no initial position is given. It also has the ability
to return information about the local environment (i.e. position contents), it is
able to inform instances of bioWorld about the transformation of a certain region
and it is translating user actions (e.g. mouse click) into coordinates which are
situated on the world. [18]
For the storage and manipulation of bioPType instances together with their bioG-
Type instances responsibilities rest with class bioPopulation. The instances of
bioPType are called phenotypes and represent single agents in the simulation.
They are built from genotypes (instances of class bioGType). For the simulation
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in this thesis a genetic algorithm is chosen which is implemented in bioPopula-
tion. Data, which are stored in this class, are phenotype instances, the size of the
array where those instances are situated, the quantity of phenotypes of a gener-
ation who perform best and get into the next one, the rate at which phenotypes
are mutated and the total, maximum, minimum and average ﬁtness. The class
creates space and it initializes a population which consists of phenotypes. Those
phenotypes have certain genotypes. The class is also responsible for the com-
parison of the ﬁtness scores of 2 bioPType instances and for the sorting process
afterwards. The method for the execution of the genetic algorithm ﬁrst checks
up whether the phenotypes are already sorted by their ﬁtness. If they aren't
sorted it invokes the sorting method. Otherwise it proceeds with the creation of
new space for the next phenotype generation. Best performers of genotypes are
directly transferred into the next generation. From the remaining ones 2 parents
are selected and a new genotype is generated as crossover of these parents. If
there exists a mutation rate, the genotype is mutated after its creation and new
phenotypes are built from the changed genotype. [18]
bioThing acts as an interface for all existing objects. Those objects can be
active, like agents inhabiting the world, or they are passive, like food that is
traded between them. The class stores a pointer which is directed to an instance
of bioWorld and it stores also an object's position and orientation. [18]
Class bioAgent is derived from bioThing. The instances of this class are controlled
by their internal programs. An instance stores a pointer to its internal program
and also an appointed intention which is represented by an integer value. The
class is comprised of several methods whereas one of them is a pure virtual one.
This virtual method normally has the duty to return the local environment's
current state during a run. [18]
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There exists also a subclass of bioAgent which is bioPType. As it has already
been mentioned before, the instances of this class are constructed from genotypes
and a certain number of them can build an instance of bioPopulation. bioPType
stores the pointer to a genotype instance. Belonging to each bioPType instance
it also stores an id, the name and the ﬁtness score. It also has the ability to
return the genotype value of a phenotype instance. [18]
bioProgram is a pure virtual class and it includes only deﬁnitions of methods
and no data. It acts as an interface for the communication between any agent
and the corresponding program. The methods deﬁned here are implemented in
the subclasses which can be, for example, a ﬁnite state machine. [18]
The class bioFSM is a subclass of bioProgram and it implements all the methods
which are deﬁned there. For this purpose it uses a ﬁnite state machine program
which is run via a table. For the table the current state and the input are
combined and construct the index. The next state and output is available via
the contents of the table at a certain index. Data which are stored in this class
are the current table, input and output, the number of bits in a state and the
size of the table. The size of the table is calculated by 2 to the power of n,
whereas n is the sum of the number of state bits and the number of input bits.
The class initializes the table by the calculation of its size and by making space
available for it. After that the table can be populated via the transformation of
an array into this table. [18]
The instances of class bioGType are owned by class bioPType and manipulation
is executed by bioPopulation instances. bioGtype stores no data and its instances
are used for the construction of new phenotypes using crossover and mutation.
[18]
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Figure 3.1: Class diagram of the SimBioSys framework including classes of the
Trade Network Game [6] [18]
3.1.2 SimBioSys Execution Cycle
In Figure 3.2 you can see the course of events in a simulation cycle of the
SimBioSys framework. The ﬁrst step is the initialization of the simulation in
creating a world. Then the simulation creates a population which inhabits the
world. After that diﬀerent cycle loops are entered. The ﬁrst loop which is
executed is the action cycle loop. An agent retrieves information about their
local environment and delivers this information to their internal program. The
program comprehends how to deal with the environmental information. Next
it reads out what action an agent has to perform when they consider the prior
input. After all the agents have decided upon their activities, the action cycle
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loop is left behind and the environment cycle loop is entered once again. This
means that the action cycle loop is situated within the environment cycle loop.
In the environment cycle statistical data about the environment is accumulated
and saved. Then each agent's ﬁtness is retrieved and the operating ﬁgures (e.g.
average ﬁtness) are calculated. If processes which are not in collaboration with
agent actions occur, it is possible that the environment is modiﬁed. After leaving
the environment cycle loop, the breeding cycle loop is reentered (i.e. action cycle
loop and environment cycle loop are situated in the breeding cycle loop) and
a breeding step is executed. At this step at ﬁrst the phenotypes (i.e. agent
programs) pass through a sorting process according to their ﬁtness. Some are
elected as parent phenotypes which are then genetically altered corresponding
to a certain algorithm. The altered phenotypes then replace the former ones in
the environment. [6]
Figure 3.2: Pseudocode for the SimBioSys framework [6]
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3.2 Network Simulation
In this section of network simulation the classes which are derived from the
overlying framework are explained and the initial parameters are speciﬁed. Next
follows a description of how the whole simulation is executed step by step.
3.2.1 Trade Network Game
The Trade Network Game is based on an ACE model which was introduced by
Leigh Tesfatsion. This simulation is a combination of evolutionary game play
and endogenous partner selection. The individuals which inhabit the system
have to develop trade strategies. Those strategies mature all the time within
the process of going through diﬀerent generations of traders. Trade partners
are chosen via the presumption of an expected payoﬀ. The agents are able to
receive this payoﬀ through the interaction with others. The interaction between
two agents is implemented as a prisoner's dilemma game. The simulation was
built based on the SimBioSys framework and implemented in C++. [6] [18]
Class tngSimulation is the subclass of bioSimulation. It stores many of the
parameter values used in the trade network game: the number of generations
that are produced in the game, the number of trade cycles which are run through
in each generation, the number of oﬀers each buyer is able to direct to sellers,
the number of oﬀers each seller can have at most on their waiting list, the
payoﬀ level that is initially expected by each trader considering other traders,
the payoﬀ a trader receives when getting a refusal to their oﬀer, the payoﬀ for
an inactive trader, the payoﬀ after mutual cooperation between traders, the
payoﬀ after mutual defection, the payoﬀ a trader gets in the case when they
defect and the other one is cooperating and vice versa, the number of all traders
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in the simulation, the number of pure buyers, the number of pure sellers, the
number of buyer-sellers and the number of how many trades have been executed
in one trade cycle. Instances of bioPopulation are stored as a population of
pure buyers, a population of pure sellers and a population of traders who are
both buyers and sellers. Furthermore all tradebots, the buyers and sellers, are
stored in diﬀerent lists (i.e. instances of bioList). There are methods in this
class for the initialization of parameters, for the initializing of generations, the
determination of trade partners, implementation of trades, calculation of ﬁtness
scores, the evolution of each generation and the allocation of payoﬀs, which are
received from the prisoner's dilemma game. [6] [18]
tngPopulation, which is derived from bioPopulation, stores no data and imple-
ments only the creation and initialization of a genotype and also the creation of
a trader which is an instance from the class of phenotypes. [6] [18]
At last there is the class for all the traders which is called tngTradeBot and is
a subclass of bioPType. This class needs an auxiliary class called TraderInfo
to store all information concerning the conducting of trades with other traders.
This information consists of the last received payoﬀ, the sum of all payoﬀs gained
via interaction with a certain trader, of how many payoﬀs have been received,
the number of refused oﬀers by the appointed trader, the expected payoﬀ, the
last actions taken, how many trades have been conducted and the status of an
oﬀer. The status can be that of `no oﬀer', an `oﬀer made' and a `rejected oﬀer'.
The class tngTradeBot itself stores how much space can be used for the ﬁnite
state machine program to record past actions, the number of bits for internal
states of the ﬁnite state machine, how many oﬀers can be at most outstanding
and how many can be at most accepted, the number of all traders, the cur-
rently outstanding, made and accepted oﬀers, the number of trade cycles where
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a trader has been inactive, the number of all payoﬀs and the sum of all payoﬀs.
Furthermore, it stores pointers to instances of the auxiliary class TraderInfo.
The methods it makes available are implementations for the trade strategy, for
the initialization of generations, for the matching of traders, methods for trading
itself and for the output of the simulation. [6] [18]
3.2.1.1 Speciﬁcation of Initial Parameters
There are two types of parameters that have to be set initially in a conﬁgura-
tion ﬁle (in this case the ﬁle is called tng.ini). The ﬁrst are parameters which
describe the virtual environment. Second, there are parameters which belong
to the traders. All of them are implemented in class tngSimulation and class
tngTradeBot respectively. Their description can be found in tables 3.1, 3.2 and
3.3. [6] [18]
3.2.1.2 Execution of the Main Program
As a ﬁrst step an instance of tngSimulation is created which invokes method
Init(). In this method the parameter values, which are used by the environment,
are implemented and printed out. A new generation of traders (which consists
of pure buyers, pure sellers and buyer-sellers) is created. Their strategies which
are used in the following trading cycles are assigned randomly (the application
ﬂow can be seen in Figure 3.3). [6] [18]
Once this is done the generation cycle loop is entered and method InitGen()
invoked. Within this method at ﬁrst the shortly before created traders are
conﬁgured with parameter values. The list of traders is ﬁlled with converted
instances from the populations of pure buyers, pure sellers and buyer-sellers.
The list of buyers is ﬁlled with pure buyers and buyer-sellers and the list of
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Parameters of the virtual environment
Parameter Data Type Description
GMax positive integer total number of generations
IMax positive integer number of trade cycles in each
trade cycle loop
RandomSeed unsigned integer seed for pseudo-random number
generator
MutationRate nonnegative number probability for bit toggling in
< 1 genetic algorithm
FsmStates positive integer number of internal ﬁnite-state-machine
(FSM) states (i.e. trade strategies)
FsmMemory positive integer FSM memory (expressed in bits) for
trade partner actions of the past
TraderCount integer > 1 total number of traders
PureBuyerCount positive integer number of pure buyers (sum of
<= total number of PureBuyerCount, PureSellerCount
traders (TraderCount) and BuySellCount >= TraderCount)
PureSellerCount positive integer number of pure sellers (sum of
<= total number of PureBuyerCount, PureSellerCount
traders (TraderCount) and BuySellCount >= TraderCount)
BuySellCount positive integer number of buyer-sellers (sum of
<= total number of PureBuyerCount, PureSellerCount
traders (TraderCount) and BuySellCount >= TraderCount)
ElitePercentPB nonnegative number percentage of elite traders in
< 1 the subpopulation of pure buyers
Table 3.1: Description of Parameter Speciﬁcation 1 [6]
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ElitePercentPS nonnegative number percentage of elite traders in
< 1 the subpopulation of pure sellers
ElitePercentBS nonnegative number percentage of elite traders in
< 1 the subpopulation of buyer-sellers
Temptation real number highest possible payoﬀ from the prisoner's
dilemma game
BothCoop real number prisoner's dilemma payoﬀ when mutual
cooperation takes place
BothDefect real number prisoner's dilemma payoﬀ when mutual
defection takes place
Sucker real number lowest possible payoﬀ from the prisoner's
dilemma game
RefusalPayoﬀ real number payoﬀ received by trader who has been
refused
WallﬂowerPayoﬀ real number payoﬀ received by trader who has been
inactive
Trader's parameters
BuyerQuota nonnegative integer quota for buyer oﬀers a buyer is able
<= PureSellerCount to place
+ BuySellCount
Table 3.2: Description of Parameter Speciﬁcation 2 [6]
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SellerQuota nonnegative integer quota for oﬀers sellers are able to
<= PureBuyerCount accept
+ BuySellCount
InitExpPayoﬀ real number payoﬀ which is initially expected from the
traders
Table 3.3: Description of Parameter Speciﬁcation 3 [6]
sellers is ﬁlled with sellers and buyer-sellers. By invocation of method Init() from
class tngTradeBot traders get their buyer oﬀer quota (which is the same for pure
buyers and buyer-sellers) and their seller acceptance quota (which is the same
for pure sellers and buyer-sellers). Furthermore, an information list is created
to store all information about other traders and waiting lists are constructed by
each seller. Those waiting lists are used for the oﬀers which are received from the
buyers. For the beginning each trader is endowed with the same expected payoﬀ
level towards others except for a trader's own payoﬀ level. This is decremented
by 1 so that the trader cannot choose himself for a trading interaction. The
generation cycle loop is repeated when all the other processes (i.e. trade cycle
loop, environmental step, evolution step) have been executed. [6] [18]
The next step is the entering of the trade cycle loop. The ﬁrst action is the assess-
ment of trading partners for the individuals by using method MatchTraders().
The precondition for this method is that each trader has a certain expected pay-
oﬀ which was stored for every single one of the others. To determine the trading
partners a variation of the `Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism' (for
more information consult [5]) is used. This method is called `deferred choice and
refusal mechanism' (DCR mechanism). All methods called on in the process of
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the DCR mechanism are implemented in class tngTradeBot. First the buyers use
method PrepareOﬀers() to set the oﬀer status of all other traders which could
be utilized as trading partners to `NO_OFFER' (i.e. no oﬀer of this trader was
directed to them in the current trade cycle). The number of outstanding oﬀers
(i.e. without feedback from potential trading partners) and the number of all
oﬀers they have already made in this trade cycle are set to zero. With SubmitOf-
fer() all buyers direct their oﬀers to sellers of whom they can expect the highest
payoﬀs (i.e. potential trading partners are sorted according to the expected pay-
oﬀ) and which have status `NO_OFFER'. One oﬀer per seller is placed until
the maximum number (i.e. buyer oﬀer quota) is reached. The oﬀer status of
each seller who has received an oﬀer is changed to `OFFER_MADE'. The oﬀer
itself is added to a seller's waiting list via TakeOﬀer(). All sellers who have
received oﬀers invoke AcceptOﬀers(). There the oﬀers are also sorted depending
on payoﬀs which are expected from the sellers. Oﬀers which produce the highest
payoﬀs are accepted until the maximum number (i.e. seller acceptance quota)
of oﬀers is reached. The remaining oﬀers are refused with OﬀerRejected(). If a
buyer receives a refusal, they have to store the refusal payoﬀ. After that they
make an upgrade of the payoﬀ they expect from the seller, who has sent the
refusal. At last he changes his status to `OFFER_REJECTED'. As soon as
the buyer has got a negative response to a sent oﬀer they can decrement the
number of outstanding oﬀers. As long as there are buyers who still have oﬀers
to submit and sellers who haven't rejected them yet the process of the making
of oﬀers is repeated. After the matching process is ﬁnished, the traders who
did not accept or manage to place an oﬀer receive a wallﬂower payoﬀ for being
inactive in this trade cycle. All oﬀers on the waiting list that weren't refused are
accepted and MatchTraders() is ﬁnished. Postconditions are that refusal payoﬀs
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and wallﬂower payoﬀs have been stored and that buyer oﬀer quota and seller
acceptance quota haven't been exceeded. [6] [18]
The second point in the trade cycle is the performance of trading interactions
with the determined trading partners (method Trade()). The precondition is
that all trading partners have already been assessed previously. It is the duty
of the sellers to start the prisoner's dilemma games with each of the buyers on
their waiting list by invocation of PlayPD(). This results in a call of method
MediateTrade() for each buyer on the waiting list. The method is implemented
in class tngSimulation. The ﬁrst action is to get a reaction from each of the
traders. Those reactions are based on the state of the ﬁnite state machine. If
a certain trader already had interactions with another one, the last FSM state
and outcome of the prisoner's dilemma game were recorded previously. Now this
inﬂuences the present game, i.e. traders develop trade strategies. After that the
actions' payoﬀs according to the traders decisions are retrieved. The information
about those payoﬀs is passed on to sellers via Sell() and to buyers via Buy().
Each trader has to add the current payoﬀ to its total payoﬀ sum. They have to
increment the total payoﬀ count, they add the achieved payoﬀ to the payoﬀ sum
which belongs to the appointed trading partner, they increment the payoﬀ and
trade count which concerns their counterpart, they record the decision which
was taken in the PD game and at last they update the expected payoﬀ for
this certain trading partner (invocation of method UpdateExp()). The expected
payoﬀ is updated every time a trader receives any payoﬀ from another one. This
can be either a payoﬀ received trough trading interaction via Buy() and Sell() or
a refusal payoﬀ, if the trading partner has refused to trade via OﬀerRejected().
Postconditions for the accomplishment of this step in the trading cycle are that
all the trading pairs have executed their trades and all data concerning trading
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interactions (e.g. payoﬀ, action) have been saved. [6] [18]
After the trade cycle loop is ﬁnished the program gets back into the generation
cycle loop, where at this point an environmental step is executed through invo-
cation of method AssessFitness(). The only precondition is that each trader has
to have a positive count of total payoﬀs. Each trader's ﬁtness is calculated via
CalcFitness(). The average payoﬀ each trader has received in all trading cycles
is ﬁgured out. The ﬁtness score, which is returned by the program, is 2 to the
power of the average payoﬀ. After that method Dump() from class tngTradeBot
is called within AssessFitness(). This method has to print out all data about
the traders themselves and about all traders they had interactions with. Infor-
mation a trader has to display about themselves, is their identiﬁers, the sum of
total payoﬀs, the number of wallﬂower payoﬀs received and their ﬁtness score.
Information they emit for traders they interacted with is the list number and the
identiﬁer of those traders, the payoﬀ sum of all contacts to a certain trader, their
refusal count, the expected payoﬀ, the trade count and the previous actions the
trader has taken in matters of former interactions. At last the subpopulations
of pure buyers, pure sellers and buyer-sellers are sorted according to their ﬁtness
score by the calling of method SortByFitness(). This method belongs to class
bioPopulation. After the leaving of AssessFitness(), another method Dump()
(this time it belongs to class tngSimulation) is invoked to print out the resulting
ﬁtness scores for all the subpopulations and the population as a whole. [6] [18]
Next there follows an evolution step via invocation of method EvolveGen().
One precondition is that all the traders of this generation have been sorted
according to their ﬁtness score. Another one states that the number of elite
traders and the predeﬁned mutation rate have to be generally accepted. At
ﬁrst all elements are removed from the lists of all traders. This also includes
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the lists of buyers and sellers. Then method Breed() from class bioPopulation
is called for every subpopulation (i.e. pure buyers, pure sellers, buyer-sellers).
This method sorts all the instances according to their ﬁtness, if they haven't
been already sorted, and it allocates space for a new generation. As the next
step a predeﬁned number of traders, those who are the ﬁttest, are transferred
to the next generation without any changes in their trading strategies. For
the remaining individuals a genetic algorithm is used. 2 parents are chosen, a
crossover is executed and the resulting children are applied as new traders in the
next generation. It can be followed that trade strategies that perform best are
kept as they were. Unsuccessful strategies are revoked and new strategies are
derived from crossover and mutation of former ones. They are adopted to see
how they will perform in the next generation cycle. [6] [18]
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Figure 3.3: Pseudocode for the Trade Network Game [6]
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4 Research Problem in Testing
There are three diﬀerent groups; namely pure buyers, pure sellers and buyer-
sellers. We want to know how they connect and build networks with a diﬀerent
number of individuals in each of the groups. A second issue we want to cover
is the inﬂuence of past memory on those connections. For this layout there are
only changes made in the numbers of agents within their single groups and in
the memory of the ﬁnite state machine. All other parameters remain the same
in each of the scenarios. I thought this approach of testing to be the best way to
achieve our objective. The goal of the research is to test the simulation ﬁrst on
how the networks are built. Second it is tested on the emergence of behaviour. So
we should be able to ﬁnd out how a society evolves. We can see how individuals
reach a positive outcome and how they keep links within the community which
have resulted in positive experiences.
The ﬁrst focus of this thesis is set on the number of pure buyers, pure sellers
and buyer-sellers. The second focus is on how far the memory of the ﬁnite-state-
machine algorithm reaches. There are 21 scenarios which were implemented for
the testing. The same grouping of agents is tested with 1, 10 and 16 bits of
memory for the ﬁnite-state-machine.
The next step is to show how the output of the program is reached in single
steps. The ﬁrst step is that each of the agents, that can play the role of a buyer,
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chooses one of the sellers and makes an oﬀer to the chosen one. As an example a
market is chosen with 3 pure buyers, 3 pure sellers and 3 buyer-sellers. Assuming
that the symbol→ signiﬁes that a certain buyer makes an oﬀer to a certain seller
(i.e. is making an oﬀer to), the ﬁrst oﬀering cycle could look like this:
PureBuyer1→ BuyerSeller2
PureBuyer2→ BuyerSeller1
PureBuyer3→ BuyerSeller1
BuyerSeller1→ PureSeller1
BuyerSeller2→ BuyerSeller1
BuyerSeller3→ PureSeller3
Next, the end of the ﬁrst oﬀering cycle starts and all those agents that play a
seller's role have to tell the buyers whether their oﬀers are accepted or refused.
Buyers that get rejected have to send new oﬀers to diﬀerent sellers. The process
of sending new oﬀers triggers oﬀ the second oﬀering cycle in the ﬁrst trading
cycle. Also buyers whose oﬀers were accepted in the previous oﬀering cycle have
to participate in sending the same oﬀers again. By doing so sellers are able to ﬁnd
out whether there could be a better oﬀer in the new ones. This renders it now
possible to bring forth the refusal of an earlier accepted oﬀer. In this example
of the ﬁrst trade cycle, which takes place in the ﬁrst generation of traders, the
oﬀering cycle has been performed six times.
The resulting oﬀering cycles can look like this:
1. oﬀering cycle:
PureBuyer1 → BuyerSeller2 | accepted
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PureBuyer2 → BuyerSeller1 | accepted
PureBuyer3 → BuyerSeller1 | refused
BuyerSeller1 → PureSeller1 | accepted
BuyerSeller2 → BuyerSeller1 | refused
BuyerSeller3 → PureSeller3 | accepted
2. oﬀering cycle:
PureBuyer1 → BuyerSeller2 | acc | acc
PureBuyer2 → BuyerSeller1 | acc | acc
PureBuyer3 → PureSeller1 | ref
BuyerSeller1 → PureSeller1 | acc | ref
BuyerSeller2 → PureSeller1 | acc
BuyerSeller3 → PureSeller3 | acc | acc
3. oﬀering cycle:
PureBuyer1 → BuyerSeller2 | acc | acc | acc
PureBuyer2 → BuyerSeller1 | acc | acc | acc
PureBuyer3 → PureSeller3 | acc
BuyerSeller1 → BuyerSeller3 | acc
BuyerSeller2 → PureSeller1 | acc | acc
BuyerSeller3 → PureSeller3 | acc | acc | ref
4. oﬀering cycle:
PureBuyer1 → BuyerSeller2 | acc | acc | acc | ref
PureBuyer2 → BuyerSeller1 | acc | acc | acc | acc
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PureBuyer3 → PureSeller3 | acc | acc
BuyerSeller1 → BuyerSeller3 | acc | acc
BuyerSeller2 → PureSeller1 | acc | acc | acc
BuyerSeller3 → BuyerSeller2 | acc
5. oﬀering cycle:
PureBuyer1 → PureSeller3 | acc
PureBuyer2 → BuyerSeller1 | acc | acc | acc | acc | acc
PureBuyer3 → PureSeller3 | acc | acc | ref
BuyerSeller1 → BuyerSeller3 | acc | acc | acc
BuyerSeller2 → PureSeller1 | acc | acc | acc | acc
BuyerSeller3 → BuyerSeller2 | acc | acc
6. oﬀering cycle:
PureBuyer1 → PureSeller3 | acc | acc
PureBuyer2 → BuyerSeller1 | acc | acc | acc | acc | acc | acc
PureBuyer3 → PureSeller2 | acc
BuyerSeller1 → BuyerSeller3 | acc | acc | acc | acc
BuyerSeller2 → PureSeller1 | acc | acc | acc | acc | acc
BuyerSeller3 → BuyerSeller2 | acc | acc | acc
So the resulting trading partners in the ﬁrst trade cycle of generation number
1 are the connections seen in the sixth oﬀering cycle. Now, that all trading
partners for the ﬁrst trade cycle are selected and accepted, the simulation is able
to continue to the second trade cycle of the ﬁrst generation.
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In the next subsections there will follow the outcomes for all executed simulations
with all those diﬀerent parameters, which have been chosen to be altered. The
outcomes will be interpreted in order to determine how the diﬀerent networks,
which emerge from those trades, evolve and how the behaviour of all traders
towards their chosen partners changes over time.
4.1 Finite State Machine Memory = 1
In the case of the memory of the ﬁnite state machine algorithm being just one
bit, you can tell from the beginning that the agents in the simulation will not
really be able to take their past experiences into consideration.
4.1.1 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 3
This is the case of an equal number of pure buyers, pure sellers and buyer-sellers.
As buyer-sellers can play both as buyers and sellers there are 6 possible buyers
and 6 possible sellers. Not all 10 trade cycles are executed in each generation.
Most of the time the trading stops after trade cycle number six is reached.
Just in generation number one, which goes through all ten trade cycles, you are
able to observe similarities in the networks. They appear in-between trade cycles
number 3 and 6. In this generation also cycles number 9 and 10 are completely
the same. This can be viewed as a coincidental happening.
The payoﬀ the agents receive is negative most of the time. Only traders from
the group of pure sellers sometimes get small positive payoﬀs or remain neutral
in their earnings. But the positive share is that small so that it doesn't really
aﬀect the average payoﬀ of all traders. The average payoﬀ remains negative
throughout all generations.
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You can already derive from the payoﬀ which behaviour the agents display in
this sample. In the ﬁrst 2 generations there is mostly defection on all sides.
Just rarely one of the pure sellers cooperates. After the ﬁrst two generations the
sellers' side always defects. On the buyers' side pure buyers begin to cooperate.
At ﬁrst there are just some pure buyers which cooperate. But as time passes by
a level of full pure buyers' cooperation is reached.
It can be followed that in this sample only random networks are built. This is
due to no reminiscence of previous actions and the prevailing negative payoﬀs
received by all the traders.
4.1.2 Pure Buyers = 6, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 3
Here there could be in total 9 traders on the buyers' side but just 6 traders on
the sellers' side. As we restrict the buyer- and seller-quota to 1, the number of
trades that can be carried out in each of the trade cycles is limited to six. Also
in this case not all possible trade cycles are run through in each generation. But
there are more generations than in the previous example that go through all ten
cycles.
There are also more weak similarities; they occur in nearly every generation.
In generation number six the networks of trade cycles number 6, 7 and 8 look
similar. The networks of trade cycles number 9 and 10 are completely the same.
Because this happens only in this generation, it can be followed that this pattern
just arises by accident.
The payoﬀ for executed trades is negative nearly all the time for all participating
agents. As in the previous sample just pure sellers have positive or neutral
outcomes. This happens less often than in the case of all agents being the
same number in every group. The average payoﬀ for all of them is negative in
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all generations. The negativity is higher than for the sample in the previous
subsection.
As before, the behaviour emits nearly only defection; there are just a few single
cooperations which occur in each of the generations. This attitude, the agents
are holding, remains constant through all generations.
The result of the testing of this sample is similar to the previous one. Networks
are also built at random. One interesting thing is, however, that there are more
similarities than before although the payoﬀs are more negative. Do those things
happen just coincidentally or is the small memory suﬃcient for remembering
some better outcomes?
4.1.3 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 6, Buyer-Sellers = 3
There could be 9 traders on the sellers' side but just 6 on the buyers'. So the
maximum of trades, which is carried out in each of the trade cycles, is six. All
10 trade cycles are passed through in each of the 10 generations.
From 1 to 6 weak similarities can be seen in the networks in each generation.
The similarities get more numerous and overlapping in the middle of the gener-
ations, i.e. around generation number 6. When reaching higher generations, the
similarities diminish again. This goes on until there are no similar connections
in generation 10.
Average payoﬀ for all traders is negative in all the generations. As in the other
examples sometimes pure sellers get slightly positive or neutral results in their
trades. This does not aﬀect the negative average.
Behaviour is mostly defective; some cooperation arises but it diminishes over
time. The pattern is that, at the beginning of each generation in the ﬁrst trade
cycles, no cooperation can be found but it appears again in higher generations.
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The networks' similarities mostly emerge for buyer-sellers which interact with
other agents. Still it can be followed that the networks are built at random and
that the similarities occur accidentally.
4.1.4 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 6
9 trades are possible on both the buyers' and the sellers' side; all trade cycles
are run through in every generation.
Just a few single similarities in the networks occur at random, the most can be
seen in generations 1 and 8.
Again the average payoﬀ for all the traders is negative. In the ﬁrst 3 generations
pure buyers and buyer-sellers just receive negative results; only the pure sellers
have some neutral or slightly positive outcomes. This does not really aﬀect the
negative average for all of them. From generation number 4 on all trader groups
get strictly negative payoﬀs.
The agents show mostly defective behaviour. Sometimes pure buyers or some
single buyer-sellers produce cooperative behaviour but this diminishes over time
until there are no pure buyers left that show cooperation.
4.1.5 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 6, Buyer-Sellers = 6
There could be 9 trades conducted on the buyers' side and 12 trades executed
on the sellers' side. So the maximum number of trades is 9 in this case. Every
trade cycle in each generation is used for the performance of trades.
In the case of a higher number of agents on one side there are much more
similarities in the designed networks than in the previous cases. The thing that
catches someone's eye here is, that most similarities are to be found in the
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interactions between buyer-sellers and buyer-sellers.
Pure sellers only receive positive average payoﬀs in each of the generations. But
the average result for pure buyers and buyer-sellers is constantly negative. The
positive outcome of the pure sellers is not able to exceed the negative one of the
remaining agents. That is why the average for all traders remains negative all
the time. On some rare occasions the payoﬀ for buyer-sellers and pure buyers
has a single neutral or positive element which already shows some tendency to
achieve better results.
Behaviour of the traders is a mix of defection and cooperation with slightly
less cooperative behaviour until the end of generation number 2. After that a
little bit more cooperation than defection can be witnessed. All buyer-sellers
cooperate and all the others don't. In generation 6 you are able to observe some
small diﬀerences. Buyer-sellers start to show defective behaviour again. As a
counterpart some of the pure buyers have a rise in cooperation. Over time this
trend reverses to the previous state of cooperation by buyer-sellers and mostly
defection by pure buyers.
Although there are many more similarities and although it seems that at least
buyer-sellers as traders choose their trading partners according to the memory
of previous interactions, you cannot recognize any pattern that is pursued in all
the generations.
4.1.6 Pure Buyers = 6, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 6
It would be possible to have 12 trades on the buyers' side and 9 trades on the
sellers' side; so there are at most 9 trades which are permitted in each trade
cycle. The maximum number of trade cycles is carried out in each generation.
This case is completely diﬀerent to the previous case, with the higher number of
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sellers. Here we have just a few single similarities. Those single similarities can
only be observed in 5 of the 10 generations. Just once, in generation number
2, the network of trade cycle number 10 is a reduced network of trade cycles
number 7, 8 and 9. This seems to happen incidentally because in trade cycle 10
there is just one trade interaction (i.e. just one link in the network) left.
Received payoﬀs begin to come into being negative and they remain negative for
pure buyers and buyer-sellers. Pure sellers start with a positive result but slide
down into negativity after generation number 1. So the average for all traders is
negative all the time.
Concerning the behaviour at the beginning of the generations there is mostly
defection mixed with a few cooperations. Defective behaviour increases over
time until there are just 2 to 6 traders per generation which show cooperation.
4.1.7 Pure Buyers = 6, Pure Sellers = 6, Buyer-Sellers = 3
9 trades can be conducted on each side of the market and all possible trade cycles
are carried out.
A few similarities can be found in each of the generations but not too many.
In most cases those similarities can be said to occur randomly. Just in one
generation you are able to ﬁnd 2 trade cycles which show an approximation to
the building of the same network (2 diﬀerences in 4 links). In this case you
cannot see any likeness of a certain group of traders to build similar connections
throughout the generations.
Pure buyers and buyer-sellers only receive negative payoﬀs from their trading
activities. Just the pure sellers show a tendency to more positive or neutral
results. In the ﬁrst 7 generations, however, their average payoﬀ remains negative.
In the last 3 generations the payoﬀ rises again to a positive status but it cannot
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outrun the negative numbers earned by the other agents. Because of that the
average result for all agents is negative in all generations.
The agents exhibit mostly defective behaviour with a few cooperations in each
trade cycle. This behaviour does not vary over time.
4.2 Finite State Machine Memory = 10
The memory of the ﬁnite state machine algorithm is augmented to 10 bits. This
leads us to the assumption that traders will tend to establish similar trading
connections if it is compliant with received payoﬀs.
4.2.1 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 3
There are just some generations which run through all 10 trade cycles; genera-
tions number 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Generations which already stop after trade
cycle 7 are generations 1, 2, and 5. Generation number 4 stops after reaching
trade cycle 8.
Similarities do not arise in any of the generations. This just happens in those
which go through all possible trade cycles. Although there aren't many of them
you are able to detect that, by the time a later trade cycle of a generation
is reached, the networks become more and more the same. In this sample in
generation number 3 trade cycles 9 and 10 are nearly the same. Cycle number
10 is a reduced version of trade cycles 9 and 7. In generation number 7 trade cycle
10 is a reduced version of cycle number 7. In generation number 8 trade cycles
7 and 8 only diﬀer in one link out of 4. From cycles 7 to 10 you are always able
to ﬁnd the same connections between two buyer-sellers. In generation number 9
cycles 9 and 10 are completely the same. They consist of 3 links. In generation
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number 10 cycles 8 and 9 are the same. They consist of 4 links. Trade cycle
number 10 is a reduced version of those two cycles.
The average payoﬀ in each of the generations is always negative for all traders. In
some generations pure sellers and buyer-sellers reach a positive result in average
for themselves. But it is not high enough to change the average which was built
for all of them.
The agent's behaviour is a mix of defection and cooperation. Pure buyers tend to
cooperate while all the others defect at the beginning. Buyer-sellers sometimes
show cooperative behaviour which returns them some positive results concerning
the payoﬀs. Pure sellers show a stable mix of cooperative and defective behaviour
all the time. This often gives them some advantage for the reception of positive
payoﬀs from their trading interactions.
In this sample you are already able to see that in some cases agents establish the
same trading networks although there are still a lot of negative payoﬀs returned.
4.2.2 Pure Buyers = 6, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 3
Generations number 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 and 10 run through all possible trade cycles.
Generations number 4 and 7 stop after cycle 5. Generation number 5 stops after
cycle 8 and generation number 6 goes on until trade cycle number 9.
As before, you can only ﬁnd similarities in those generations which run through
all possible trade cycles. In generation number one trade cycles 9 and 10 are
completely the same (consisting of one link). This link can also be found from
trade cycles 2 to 8. Generation number 2 shows the same networks from trade
cycles number 8 to number 10 (composed of 1 link). You can also ﬁnd this
connection already from cycles 2 to 7. Generation 3 has the same networks from
trade cycles 8 to 10 (1 link). Those graphs are reduced versions of cycles 6 and
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7. In generation number 8 trade cycles 9 and 10 are the same (1 link). They
are reduced versions of cycles number 5, 7 and 8. The trade cycle networks (7,
8, 9, 10) in generation number 9, that are completely alike, are composed of
3 connections. They are reduced versions of cycles 4, 5 and 6. In generation
number 10 trade cycles 8 and 10 are completely the same (3 links). They are
reduced versions of trade cycle number 6.
In the ﬁrst 2 generations you are able to observe some positive results for pure
buyers and pure sellers. After that pure buyers step into a negative range and
pure sellers keep their average payoﬀs positive until reaching generation 5. Until
generation 9 the average results for all trading groups are negative. Then the
pure sellers again change to positive. The average result for all agents together
remains negative through all generations.
Concerning the behaviour at ﬁrst you can see a mix of cooperation and defection
with a little bit more on the defective side. After generation number 4 there's
mostly defection with hardly any cooperation left. From generation number 8
more cooperation occurs again. At the end in generations 9 and 10 a total change
in behaviour can be observed. More cooperation than defection takes place.
As can be seen in this case, somehow the behaviour of all traders and the estab-
lishment of connections in the network depend on each other. You can also see
that the more memory there is at the traders' disposal the more they are likely
to cooperate. With more memory and cooperation they tend to keep the same
trading relationships.
4.2.3 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 6, Buyer-Sellers = 3
This testing sample is going through all trade cycles in each generation.
The similarities here aren't as obvious as in the samples for a ﬁnite state machine
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memory of 10 before. It is more like in the case of this constellation of trader
groups with a memory of 1 bit. There are quite a few more similarities but it is
diﬃcult to ﬁnd them out on ﬁrst sight. So for example in generation number 1
you are able to see 2 connections which are the same in trade cycles 8, 9 and 10
out of 4 to 6 links.
For the reception of payoﬀs it is quite the same as in the case with memory of 1.
The overall average is remaining negative for all generations. The only thing you
are able to see is that sometimes pure sellers have a positive result in average
for their group.
Behaviour is also nearly the same as in the sample with a ﬁnite state machine
memory of 1; just a little bit more cooperative behaviour can be observed but
there is still a lot of defection remaining.
4.2.4 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 6
There are a few similarities in the networks in all generations except for genera-
tion number 1. In generation 5 you can ﬁnd 3 connections out of 4 connections
which are the same in trade cycles 9 and 10. You can also see 2 of those 3 links
in generation 8 and one of them in generations number 5 and 6. Trade cycle 10
of generation 7 is a reduced version of cycles number 8 and 9. In generation 8
the only diﬀerence of trade cycles 9 and 10 (composed of 3 links) is one link. You
are able to see the network which is established in trade cycle 10 of generation
number 9 also in cycles 5 and 8 and half of it in cycles 1, 6, 7 and 9. In generation
10 there are 3 links which are the same in trade cycles number 6, 7, 9 and 10.
Concerning the traders' payoﬀs the average of pure buyers is negative in each of
the generations, the average of pure sellers is positive in each of the generations
and the average of buyer-sellers is negative in all of them. The positive result of
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the pure sellers cannot exceed the other negative ones. So the overall average is
negative.
At the beginning of the generations there is mostly defection but you are able to
observe more cooperation than in the case with a memory of 1 bit. Cooperative
behaviour grows over time but, as soon as generation number 7 is ﬁnished,
defection increases a little bit again.
4.2.5 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 6, Buyer-Sellers = 6
The similarities that can be seen in this case aren't too numerous; it looks like
there are less of them than in the sample where memory of the ﬁnite state
machine algorithm is just one bit. However, more of them appear in the last
trade cycles of each generation. The similarities also mostly appear in trading
interactions between buyer-sellers.
The overall traders' payoﬀ average is negative. Pure buyers and buyer-sellers
just receive negative payoﬀs in average. Pure sellers get some positive and some
negative results. So in this case you are able to see more negative results than
in the sample with memory being just one.
There is a mix of defection and cooperation which is nearly the same as in the
case of a memory of 1. However, you are able to observe slightly more defective
behaviour. From this you can derive that the more defection happens the higher
become the negative payoﬀs which are received by the agents. Cooperative
behaviour mainly comes from buyer-sellers. They are also those traders which
tend to keep their trading relationships.
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4.2.6 Pure Buyers = 6, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 6
In this sample you are able to ﬁnd some similarities in the networks on ﬁrst sight.
The ﬁrst time, where the agents decide to keep the same trading relationships
in the last few trade cycles, happens in generation number 4. There the cycles
8, 9 and 10 are completely the same (consisting of 3 links). This also occurs
in generation number 7 (1 link). This connection is a reduced version of trade
cycles 5 to 7. In generation number 5 cycles 7, 8 and 9 look similar and trade
cycle number 10 is a reduced version of cycles 3 to 9. The same is true for trade
cycle 10 in generation 9, but only for the cycles from number 6 to number 9.
In the ﬁrst generation the averages of all trading groups are negative. Beginning
from the second generation this occurs only for pure buyers and buyer-sellers;
pure sellers receive a positive average payoﬀ. However, the payoﬀ is not as high
as to change the overall average payoﬀ to a positive value. This remains negative
in all generations.
The agents' behaviour in the ﬁrst generation is mostly defective but after that
cooperation increases until a stable mix of defection and cooperation is reached.
Cooperation can be primarily found on the buyers' side and defection is mainly
on the sellers' side.
4.2.7 Pure Buyers = 6, Pure Sellers = 6, Buyer-Sellers = 3
In generation 3 you can see that the networks of trade cycles number 8, 9 and 10
are very similar. There are 3 to 4 connections which are the same out of 5 to 6
links. It is possible to ﬁnd some similarities in the cycles 6, 7 and 8 of generation
number 4, in trade cycles 7, 8 and 9 of generation 5 etc. So to speak, you can
ﬁnd them in each of the generations. This begins in generation number 3.
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The ﬁrst generation starts with a negative average payoﬀ for all trading groups.
In generations number 2 and 3 the pure sellers' average reverts to positive and
the overall average remains negative. In the next generation not just the pure
sellers but also the buyer-sellers receive a positive average result but the overall
average is still negative. This changes in generations number 5 and 6. There
the overall average reaches a positive status although just the pure sellers keep
a positive result for themselves. All the others receive negative ones. From
generations number 7 to 10 the average for all the groups themselves is the same
but the average for all of them together shrinks to a negative payoﬀ again.
Behaviour triggers oﬀ similarly as in the sample with a ﬁnite state memory of
1 bit. However, cooperation increases over time until defective behaviour nearly
disappears. Defection just remains at ﬁrst on some occasions and then it rises
again to a stable mix on the sellers' side.
4.3 Finite State Machine Memory = 16
Here you can ﬁnd the tests with the most memory available for the ﬁnite state
machine algorithm in this case. It is possible to observe a tendency to form alike
networks of trading interactions and a liability to cooperative behaviour.
4.3.1 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 3
Starting already in the ﬁrst generation, trade cycles 7 and 8 (consisting of 4
links) and 9 and 10 (consisting of 3 links) are the same. The latter two are
reduced versions of the ﬁrst two. In generation 2 and trade cycles 9 and 10 you
are able to see 3 alike connections out of 4, which is also true for generation
number 3. Trade cycles 9 and 10 of generation 4 are the same (3 links) and a
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reduced version of cycle 7. Trade cycles 8 and 10 of generation 5 are alike (3
connections), cycle 9 is equal except for 1 single link. They are also reduced
versions of cycles 4 and 7. A similar pattern can also be seen in the rest of the
generations.
Concerning the reception of payoﬀs in the ﬁrst two generations the traders start
with a negative overall payoﬀ whereas the pure sellers' average is already positive.
From the third generation onwards the overall average payoﬀ keeps a positive
level. Pure sellers and buyer-sellers are positive in average in generation number
3. After that pure buyers and pure sellers receive positive average results and
buyer-sellers get negative ones.
You can observe mostly cooperative behaviour throughout the generations. In
generations number 1 and 2 there are just a few single pure buyers and pure
sellers which defect. From the third generation on there are only pure sellers
with defective behaviour.
4.3.2 Pure Buyers = 6, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 3
Considering networks, this is one of the best examples for traders which take their
previous trading interactions into account. Traders keep those partners in mind,
they are satisﬁed with, and keep up their relationships. Already in generation
1 trade cycles 4 and 5 are the same (consisting of 4 links) and trade cycles 6 to
10 are also completely alike (3 links) whereas they are reduced versions of the
previous two cycles. Generation number 2 shows completely the same networks
in each trade cycle as generation number 1. In generation 3 the cycles from 5 to
10 are the same (consisting of 4 links). Similar patterns can be seen for the rest
of the generations.
A phenomenon that is interesting in this case is that, as soon as payoﬀs are
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concerned, the trading groups receive many negative average payoﬀs. This is
the case because many of the traders, which aren't taken as trading partners,
are valued with a negative expected payoﬀ from the beginning. So a lot of
positive payoﬀs is needed to get out of negativity. From generation 1 to 5 the
average that is received by pure buyers and buyer-sellers is negative and the
average for pure sellers is positive. In the ﬁfth generation the positivity of pure
sellers is that high that also the average for all groups together is positive. In
generations 6, 7 and 8 also the buyer-sellers' average is positive and so the total
average is also positive or neutral. Generation 9 shows the same pattern as the
ﬁrst few generations which is also true for generation number 10 except that the
total average there is neutral.
You can ﬁnd a lot of cooperation from the beginning with some defections which
diminish over time. From generation number 6 the behaviour shifts to total
cooperation. This drives the average into a positive level at last.
4.3.3 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 6, Buyer-Sellers = 3
As there aren't many similarities in the networks of the other test versions with
lower ﬁnite state machine memory you cannot ﬁnd a total equality like in other
samples with the same memory. Still it is obvious that, with a rise in memory,
you can also ﬁnd a rise in the alikeness of networks. In generation number 2
trade cycles 9 and 10 have 5 identical connections out of 6. The same is true
for generation 3. This pattern can be tracked throughout all the generations. In
generation 10 you can ﬁnd the similarities already from trade cycles 7 to 10.
Considering the reception of payoﬀs the only negative overall average can be
found in generation number 1. After that the average for all trading groups
together remains positive. In half of the cases the pure buyers' average is negative
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and the pure sellers' and buyer-sellers' average is positive. In the other half all
of them receive positive results.
The traders start with a mix of cooperation and defection. More agents are on
the side of cooperative behaviour. Then defection at ﬁrst disappears from the
buyers' side and increases a bit on the sellers'. After that it vanishes from both
sides. In the last generation behaviour reaches a level of total cooperation.
4.3.4 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 6
The networks of each generation do not converge to total equality but you are
able to ﬁnd many similarities. Beginning with generation number 1 there are
4 to 5 identical connections from trade cycles 5 to 10 out of 6 to 8 links. In
generation two the networks of cycles 7 to 10 consist of 7 connections whereas
at least 5 links are the same. This also goes on in the rest of the generations; in
generation 7 trade cycles 9 and 10 are completely the same.
In the ﬁrst 3 generations the average payoﬀ for pure buyers is negative, the
average for pure sellers is positive and the average for buyer-sellers alternates
from negative to positive and then to neutral. So in generation 1 and 3 the
overall average is negative and for all the other generations it is positive. From
generation number 4 all averages for every group are positive.
Concerning the agents' behaviour there is mostly cooperation at the beginning
with just a few defections until generation number 5. After that behaviour shifts
to total cooperation.
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4.3.5 Pure Buyers = 3, Pure Sellers = 6, Buyer-Sellers = 6
You can ﬁnd more similarities in this case than in the sample with less ﬁnite
state machine memory. However, they aren't too obvious because there are just
a few of them hidden in many more connections. The most similarities here can
be seen in trading interactions between buyer-sellers.
The overall average payoﬀ is always negative except for generation number 6
where it is positive. Pure buyers get a negative average payoﬀ in each of the
generations, pure sellers have negative results in the ﬁrst few generations and
then they shift to positive. Buyer-sellers receive mostly negative and sometimes
positive averages.
You are able to see a mix of cooperation and defection whereas cooperative
behaviour rises a little bit over time. In this sample not just the buyer-sellers
show a tendency for cooperation but also on some occasions the pure sellers in
the last few generations.
4.3.6 Pure Buyers = 6, Pure Sellers = 3, Buyer-Sellers = 6
In generation number 1 the network of trade cycle 10 consists of 4 connections
and is a reduced version of cycle number 9. Generation 2 has similarities in
cycles number 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10. There are 2 to 3 equal connections out of 5.
Networks which are completely the same can be found in generation 3 in trade
cycles 9 and 10 (consisting of 2 links). These networks are reduced versions of
cycles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8. In this testing sample you can see generations without
many similarities and also generations with lots of them. This alternates over
time.
Considering the payoﬀs all the averages for each of the groups are mostly nega-
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tive. Just in two generations the pure sellers manage to get a positive result. So
the overall average payoﬀ is also negative in each of the generations.
Behaviour starts with a balanced mix of cooperation and defection. After that
cooperation rises and then diminishes again until defection prevails.
4.3.7 Pure Buyers = 6, Pure Sellers = 6, Buyer-Sellers = 3
In every generation you are able to ﬁnd some similarities. Beginning in genera-
tion 1 you can see 3 alike connections out of 5 to 6 links in trade cycles 6 and
7. There are also 3 equal connections from networks which consist of 4 links in
cycles 8, 9 and 10. Trade cycle 10 of generation 2 is a reduced version of cycle
number 9 and has also got some similarities with cycle 8. As the pattern in those
2 examples it goes further on in the other generations. There are more equal
connections in every second generation but there are also some in the other ones.
The overall average for all groups together remains negative throughout every
generation. The average payoﬀs for pure buyers and buyer-sellers are always
negative. Only the pure sellers receive positive results on some rare occasions.
From the beginning until the end of the generations you can ﬁnd a mix of defec-
tion and cooperation. At ﬁrst there is more defective behaviour. Then coopera-
tion rises until it reaches a slightly higher level than defection.
4.4 Conclusion
The ﬁrst goal of this research was to determine how networks are built when
the links of these networks are established via interactions of individuals. In
this thesis the interactions took place on a simulated marketplace. Concerning
networks the building process was not the only issue which was investigated. We
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also wanted to know whether the individuals tended to keep their connections
and what were the requirements for keeping them. The second goal was to
test the simulation on emergence of behaviour. Here the only two possible stati
were cooperation and defection. We wanted to ﬁnd out when there was more
cooperation or more defection or just a mix of the two.
The results were interpretations of the output of the simulation. The program
showed all trading interactions between all the agents, what payoﬀ each of the
agents had received for a certain trading relationship and what behaviour the
agents have had in an interaction. To have an overview of the networks which
were built in each of the generations, I plotted all the graphs on paper. Each
generation was drawn on an A4 page.
The results were the following; with higher memory the individuals, which in-
teracted in the simulation, tended to keep their relationships. So you can tell
that, at ﬁrst with hardly any memory, the networks were built randomly in later
trading cycles of one generation cycle. The more memory they had the more
you could observe a convergence to a certain graph in later trading cycles of
a generation cycle. Whether a graph really converged to a certain picture was
also dependent on the payoﬀ. Agents wanted to keep the relationships which
returned them positive payoﬀs. So the positive links were kept and the negative
ones were revoked. In some cases in our testing samples the total average pay-
oﬀ did not reach a positive level although the emergence of similarities and the
behaviour showed otherwise. In this case you could see a lot of equalities and
cooperation which should have been a signal for the reception of many positive
payoﬀs. However, sometimes the expected payoﬀ for each of the agents was that
negative that they were not able to reach a positive outcome in the end. In
most cases in our tests the resulting networks and behaviour really ﬁt to the
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output. Many negative total averages signiﬁed higher randomness in the graphs
and more defections in behaviour.
It was interesting that an artiﬁcial society also came to the same conclusion as
real societies did. When memory was included, the agents tried to reach a high
level of prosperity for the whole society. So there were many individuals which
got a medium reward instead of a small number which received a high reward.
From the point of logic you would say that every agent in the artiﬁcial world just
tried to get out the best for themselves and did not care for the others. The best
reward was reached via defection if the other interaction partner cooperated.
However, if both partners defected, the output was lower than the output for a
mutual cooperation. So the emergence of behaviour was very likely to display
mostly cooperative behaviour.
In the following tables (from table 4.1 to table 4.7) you can ﬁnd an overview
of all results of the simulation.
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Pure Buyer = 3, Pure Seller = 3, Buyer-Seller = 3
Finite State Machine Memory = 1
Similarity random networks
Payoﬀ negative average payoﬀs
Behaviour mostly defection
Finite State Machine Memory = 10
Similarity alike networks in the generations where the
program runs through all trade cycles
Payoﬀ total average always negative, sometimes positive
average for pure sellers and buyer-sellers
Behaviour mix of defection and cooperation, pure buyers show
more cooperation, buyer-sellers cooperate
sometimes, pure sellers have a balanced mix
Finite State Machine Memory = 16
Similarity equal networks in the last trade cycles of every generation
Payoﬀ total average in the ﬁrst generation negative,
in all other generations the average is positive
Behaviour mostly cooperation
Table 4.1: Results for the testing with 3 pure buyers, 3 pure sellers and 3 buyer-
sellers
95
Pure Buyer = 6 , Pure Seller = 3 , Buyer-Seller = 3
Finite State Machine Memory = 1
Similarity random networks but more similarities than in the case
with 3 pure buyers, 3 pure sellers and 3 buyer-sellers
Payoﬀ higher negative payoﬀ than in the case with 3
pure buyers, 3 pure sellers and 3 buyer-sellers
Behaviour defection with hardly any cooperation
Finite State Machine Memory = 10
Similarity alike networks in the generations where the
program runs through all trade cycles, but
more than in the case with 3 pure buyers, 3 pure
sellers and 3 buyer-sellers
Payoﬀ the average for pure buyers and pure sellers is sometimes
positive, the total average is always negative
Behaviour mix of cooperation and defection, at ﬁrst there
is more defection and in the last two generations
there is more cooperation
Finite State Machine Memory = 16
Similarity fast convergence to equal networks in each of the
generations
Payoﬀ in the ﬁrst 4 generations the total average is negative,
then it switches to a positive or neutral level
Behaviour mostly cooperation, from generation 6 onwards there is
total cooperation
Table 4.2: Results for the testing with 6 pure buyers, 3 pure sellers and 3 buyer-
sellers
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Pure Buyer = 3 , Pure Seller = 6 , Buyer-Seller = 3
Finite State Machine Memory = 1
Similarity random networks, the most similarities occur between
buyer-sellers
Payoﬀ the total average is negative
Behaviour mostly defection
Finite State Machine Memory = 10
Similarity some equalities in the networks but less than in
the case with 6 pure buyers, 3 pure sellers and
3 buyer-sellers
Payoﬀ sometimes the average payoﬀ for pure sellers is
positive, the total average is always negative
Behaviour there is mostly defection with some cooperation
Finite State Machine Memory = 16
Similarity there are many equal networks in the last 2 trade
cycles of every generation
Payoﬀ the total average of the ﬁrst generation is negative,
then it switches to positive
Behaviour mix of cooperation and defection with a higher level
of cooperation, in the last generation there is
total cooperation
Table 4.3: Results for the testing with 3 pure buyers, 6 pure sellers and 3 buyer-
sellers
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Pure Buyer = 3 , Pure Seller = 3 , Buyer-Seller = 6
Finite State Machine Memory = 1
Similarity random networks with a few single similarities
Payoﬀ the total average is always negative
Behaviour mostly defection
Finite State Machine Memory = 10
Similarity some equalities in the network connections
Payoﬀ although the average for pure sellers is positive, the
total average is always negative
Behaviour mostly defection, but less than with a memory of 1 bit
Finite State Machine Memory = 16
Similarity many similarities
Payoﬀ the total average for generations 1 and 3 is negative,
for all the other generations it is positive
Behaviour mostly cooperation, after generation 5 total cooperation
Table 4.4: Results for the testing with 3 pure buyers, 3 pure sellers and 6 buyer-
sellers
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Pure Buyer = 3 , Pure Seller = 6 , Buyer-Seller = 6
Finite State Machine Memory = 1
Similarity still no real pattern, but many more similarities than in the
previous cases with a memory of 1 bit
Payoﬀ although the average for pure sellers is positive, the
total average is always negative
Behaviour mix of defection and cooperation
Finite State Machine Memory = 10
Similarity networks are very random, there seem to be less similarities
than in the case with a memory of 1 bit
Payoﬀ pure sellers sometimes show a positive average, but the total is
negative, there seems to be more negativity than with a
memory of 1 bit
Behaviour mix of defection and cooperation with a little bit more defection,
cooperation comes mainly from buyer-sellers
Finite State Machine Memory = 16
Similarity there are many equal links but they are not too obvious
Payoﬀ the total average is negative, except for generation 6 (positive)
Behaviour mix of cooperation and defection, cooperation rises,
buyer-sellers and pure sellers tend to cooperate in the
last few generations
Table 4.5: Results for the testing with 3 pure buyers, 6 pure sellers and 6 buyer-
sellers
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Pure Buyer = 6 , Pure Seller = 3 , Buyer-Seller = 6
Finite State Machine Memory = 1
Similarity random networks with just a few similarities
Payoﬀ the total average is negative all the time
Behaviour mostly defection
Finite State Machine Memory = 10
Similarity many similarities on ﬁrst sight in some generations
Payoﬀ in the ﬁrst generation all averages are negative, after
that the pure sellers' average is mostly positive but
the total average remains negative
Behaviour at ﬁrst there is mostly defection, then cooperation
increases until reaching a balanced mix of defection
and cooperation
Finite State Machine Memory = 16
Similarity the occurrence of equal links alternates in every generation
between many and not so many connections
Payoﬀ the total average is always negative
Behaviour mix of cooperation and defection, at last there is a higher
level of defection
Table 4.6: Results for the testing with 6 pure buyers, 3 pure sellers and 6 buyer-
sellers
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Pure Buyer = 6 , Pure Seller = 6 , Buyer-Seller = 3
Finite State Machine Memory = 1
Similarity random networks with just a few similarities
Payoﬀ pure sellers tend to receive a positive average, the total is
always negative
Behaviour mostly defection
Finite State Machine Memory = 10
Similarity equalities in the networks in every generation after generation 2
Payoﬀ there are some generations with a positive total average, the
other generations have a negative one
Behaviour in the case where the total average is positive defection nearly
disappears, when it is negative there is a balanced mix of
cooperation and defection
Finite State Machine Memory = 16
Similarity the occurrence of equal links alternates in every generation
between really many and many connections
Payoﬀ the total average is negative
Behaviour mix of cooperation and defection, at last there is a higher
level of cooperation
Table 4.7: Results for the testing with 6 pure buyers, 6 pure sellers and 3 buyer-
sellers
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A Inhaltsangabe
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, die Ergebnisse einer agentenbasierten ökonomischen
Computersimulation unter verschiedenen strukturellen Bedingungen zu vergle-
ichen. Obwohl es zwischen Agenten (Agenten-Programmen) aus der Informatik
und den hier tatsächlich simulierten Individuen Verbindungen beziehungsweise
Änlichkeiten gibt, haben diese 2 Konzepte unterschiedliche Bedeutungen  im
Fall hier sind Agenten die Verkörperung von Denken (in sehr unterschiedlichen
Ausmaßen) und Lernen (dieses wird stark unterschiedlich modelliert). Die Kom-
plexität des Denkens dieser Agenten und die Lernmuster, die sie innehaben,
sind laufend Themen der Forschung. Aber hier in dieser Arbeit richtet sich der
Fokus mehr auf die Modellierung des Musters, das durch die Wechselbeziehun-
gen der Agenten entsteht. So will man herausﬁnden wie eine Gesellschaft von
innen heraus funktioniert  die Basis dafür sind denkende Agenten. Aktuelle
Wissenschaftsliteratur dieses Themas diskutiert verschiedene Ansätze für un-
terschiedliche ökonomische und soziale Problemstellungen. Die Ansätze sind
agentenbasiert und folgen einem bottom-up- Konzept. Die stark abweichenden
Ansichten in dieser Forschung entstehen dadurch, dass viele unterschiedliche
Fachrichtungen (Soziologie, Psychologie, Physik, Informatik, Recht, Politik-
wissenschaft, etc.) daran arbeiten, die alle andere Forschungsziele verfolgen.
Diese Ansätze sind deshalb nur mehr mit computergestützten Simulationen
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auszuführen, weil Entscheidungen und Wechselbeziehungen einer sehr großen
Anzahl von Agenten simuliert werden. Das erfordert sehr viele Berechnungen
und es werden algorithmische Methoden verwendet, die für algebraische Mod-
elle nicht mehr möglich sind. Eine Frage der Forschung beschäftigt sich mit
dem Typ und der Form der Wechselbeziehungen, mit der Lernstruktur und dem
Raum, wo die Agenten `leben'. Angeblich führen unterschiedliche Voraussetzun-
gen in diesen Bereichen zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen. In der Literatur gibt es
Modelle bei denen die Agenten im Raum leben  nämlich auf zwei-dimensionalen
Flächenrastern (gleichmäßig oder ungleichmäßig) wo sie mit ihren Nachbarn in-
teragieren. Weiters gibt es Modelle, die nicht räumlich sind. Dort kann jeder mit
jedem in Wechselbeziehung treten. Neuere Modelle betrachten die Beziehungen
zwischen den Agenten aus einer neuen Perspektive. Diese ist soziologisch und
stellt die Behauptung auf, dass wichtige Eigenschaften einer Gesellschaft von
ihrer Form abzuleiten sind. Diese Arbeit soll die Ergebnisse einer ökonomischen
bzw. soziologischen Simulation vergleichen. Es werden verschiedene Eingangspa-
rameter bestimmt und untersucht, wie sich diese auf die entstehende Struktur
und das Verhalten der Agenten auswirken.
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